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7

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CONTENTS

Psychiatry: A Debate on Freudianism

A Critical Analysis of Freudianism F. V. BASSIN 3

An Answer to F. V. Bassin's Criticism
CESARE L. MUSATTI 14

Rejoinder F. V. BASSIN 27

The Arts

Film Trends: East and West SERGEI GERASIMOV 45

Introduction to "The Diary of
Anne Frank" ILYA EHRENBURG 56

Science and Technology

The Electronic Brain Helps
the Surgeon S. IARMOLIUK 62

Modern Science in Crime
Detection A. VINBERG 64

Notes

Popular Participation in Government 68

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Index to THE SOVIET REVIEW, Volume I 71

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A Debate on Freudianism

A critique of Freudianism appeared in two articles by Professor F. V. Bassin of the Institute of Neurology, USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, in *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 1958, Nos. 5-6. The bulk of the first of these articles and the concluding section of the second are reproduced below under the title "A Critical Analysis of Freudianism." Professor Bassin's articles later appeared in *Rivista Psicoanalisi*, 1959, No. 2, and were followed by a rebuttal by Professor Cesare L. Musatti, Director of the Institute of Psychology, Milan University. Professor Musatti's article and a rejoinder by Professor Bassin are taken, slightly abridged, from *Voprosy Psikhologii*, 1960, No. 3. Extensive bibliographical references have been omitted.

While the articles, particularly the first, contain technical material, the editors believe that the reader will find the approaches to psychological questions discussed here of unusual interest.

A Critical Analysis of Freudianism

By F. V. Bassin

In recent years Freud's teaching has frequently been the subject of critical discussion both in Soviet and in foreign literature. There is no doubt that modern Freudianism, whose influence has become widespread abroad and which claims to be, in essence, a philosophical system with a world outlook, has become a profoundly reactionary concept sharply hostile to dialectical materialist trends in the fields of neurological and humanist sciences.

What are the reasons prompting us once more to return to a consideration of this theory?

First, the development of teachings on the localization of brain functions has shed new light upon the significance of the activity of subcortical structures in relation to complex forms of cerebral activity. This fact, which reflects indisputable progress, is of extreme importance for the further development of neurophysiology. At the same time it has had certain negative

consequences. In the field of psychology and psychiatry abroad it has resulted in a great revival of Freudian interpretations, which attempt to use these new data to strengthen psychoanalytic concepts. In neurology it has stimulated the revival of an approach which goes back to the beginning of the century and persistently tries to connect the functions of the higher forms of cerebral activity with those of structures at the subcortical level.

It is therefore necessary, after attentively considering the new data on localization, to show how unfounded are the attempts to use them as a defense of the basic thesis of Freudianism regarding the major role which affective and vitalist factors of subcortical origin allegedly play in determining behavior. However we can only accomplish this effectively if we simultaneously show exactly how these new data are explained from the angle of Pavlov's concept of the function of subcortical structures.

There is another reason which prompts us to return to criticism of the psychoanalytic concept. A hitherto unknown work by Freud, *The Project*, written in 1895, was discovered and first published in 1954. In the light of this work the entire history of Freudianism emerges as a process of constantly increasing scientific degradation of psychoanalytic ideas, a process closely connected with the rejection of the mechanistic interpretation Freud adhered to in the early phase of the elaboration of his concept. In view of this interpretation we are faced with the necessity of drawing a line between Freud's early clinical-psychological ideas, which are limited to a mechanistic world outlook and show a definite potential for productive development, and all the speculative, scientifically and philosophically inadequate interpretations which came later and which in the end transformed Freudianism into one of the most reactionary manifestations of modern bourgeois ideology, profoundly hostile to genuine scientific progress.

Let us first consider the birth and development of Freudian teachings, then analyze the attitudes of modern neo-Freudianism to problems of the localization of brain functions.

* * *

A study of more than half a century of evolution of Freudianism enables us to divide it into four successive stages.

The first dates back to the last fifteen years of the past century. In this period Freud, jointly with Breuer, published

two monographs* in which the basic theses of his theory of repression were first formulated and which later became the basis of the psychoanalytic theory of functional disorders. The essence of these theses is that every emotional experience which produces an urge to definite action possesses a store of energy that tries to manifest itself in behavior. Suppressed, this energy can provoke hysterical symptoms.

There is no doubt whatever that in this early phase Freud was not as yet an adherent of antiphysiological idealism. On the contrary his investigations, which attempt directly to deduce the basic psychological laws from the specificities of excitation and inhibition of the cortical neurons, characterize him as a positivistically minded neuropathologist who concentrated on studying first aphasia and children's paralyses and later problems of the therapy of functional disorders, and who tried to base himself on all the real knowledge which had accumulated by the end of the 19th century. In his study of aphasia he criticized the narrow localization theories of Broca and Wernike from a broader position, close in spirit to Hughlings Jackson's. There is no indication in Freud's work at this stage of any inclination towards speculative psychological theories.

In the second stage, which has been frequently criticized in our literature, Freud advanced the theory of psychological factors which suppress the instincts that are striving for fulfillment, a theory which uses the pretentious symbols of *ego*, *super-ego*, and *sensor*; an analysis was made of the conditions under which the pathogenic energy of the suppressed impulse could be neutralized (the chief of these conditions being to achieve consciousness of the suppressed desire); methods for psychoanalytically revealing the repressed affects were elaborated; and finally a complex system of concepts on the nature of suppressed desires was created. From the viewpoint of orthodox Freudianism these suppressed desires are almost exclusively of a sexual nature.

Freud's methodological views in this period are reflected in his characteristic conviction that inasmuch as we know little about the physiological mechanisms of the brain, psychological theory must be elaborated independently of physiology. This refusal to include physiological concepts in psychological analysis is characteristic of Freudianism of that period. It is

* S. Freud and J. Breuer, *On the Psychic Mechanism of the Phenomena of Hysteria*, St. Petersburg, 1899; *Essays on Hysteria*, St. Petersburg, 1900.

the very antithesis of Pavlov's famous refusal in the early 20th century to include psychological concepts in a system of physiological analysis. History has shown what a high price Freud paid for his attempt to build a theory of the activity of the brain while ignoring the physiological theory of the brain mechanisms. In refusing to have anything to do with physiology, he naturally was compelled to turn to generalizations in the socio-historical sphere. And inasmuch as Marxist ideology remained profoundly alien to Freud throughout his lifetime, his excursions into the field of sociology could not but end in historical idealism and finally obscurantism. This may be clearly seen in such latter-day theories as that of the origin of human society based on the oedipus complex, the concept of wars being biologically determined by an innate instinct of aggression, denial of the value of cultural progress, the theory of the existence of a special death instinct, and a number of other metapsychological concepts.

The period when these works dealing with sociological questions were written covers the last two decades of Freud's life and constitutes the third stage in the development of the psychoanalytic concept. The fourth and last stage of Freudianism refers to the post-war period and the present.

What is most characteristic of this fourth stage is the unexpected change in the attitude of psychoanalysts towards physiology. The insoluble difficulties encountered by psychoanalytic theory in connection with its traditional antiphysiologism, and the consequent ideological blind alley in which Freudianism found itself have given rise to profound differences of opinion within the camp of Freudians themselves and have led to a revision of attitudes towards the concepts and methods of modern neuro- and electrophysiology. This change is strikingly evident in a report made by L. Kubie, one of the most eminent Freudians in the USA, at the Fourteenth International Psychological Congress held in 1954 in Montreal, and in a number of other recent works by Freudians. The new orientation which they were obviously forced to accept underscores the sterility of the basic trends pursued by psychoanalysis in the past. At the same time it sets the critics of Freudianism the task of disproving certain physiological pseudo-arguments advanced by modern psychoanalysts.

Such are the four basic stages which characterize the evolu-

tion of Freudianism. My purpose, however, is to discuss only the first and the fourth of these, since the second stage has already been the subject of extensive criticism and it seems to me superfluous to discuss Freud's pseudo-scientific metapsychology.

* * *

As already mentioned, Freud and Breuer started with the theory that inhibited impulses create conflicts and become pathogenic. How did Freud develop this idea later?

It is hardly necessary to point out that the concept of the pathogenic nature of the conflict of impulses is in itself an important general thesis which Pavlov advanced clinically quite independently of Freud's theory. Physiologists of the Pavlov school convincingly showed how serious functional and organic disorders may develop as a result of vital affective conflicts.

It follows that the idea of the pathogenic nature of the conflict of impulses can in no way be equated with the Freudian psychological interpretation. This must be stressed since there still, unfortunately, exists the widespread and incorrect idea that conflicts of impulses are being studied only by Freudians.

In order to make clear our objections to the Freudian presentation of the problem of affective conflict we must recall the very specific explanation of the mechanisms of conflict as advanced by Freud, apparently under the influence of Charcot's ideas. This was based on the supposition that an absolute relationship exists between the nature of the suppressed impulse and the nature of the manifest clinical syndrome, so that the clinical syndrome is not only caused by the suppressed impulse but also symbolically expresses it in behavior.

The work conducted in our clinics shows that most often the disorders treated concern non-specific changes which are in no way connected with the psychological content of the patient's inner conflicts. As regards the considerably rarer cases of hysterics seen in our clinics, when a definite tie exists between functional disturbances arising from conflict and the psychological content of this conflict, we can speak of the specific manifestation of the suppressed impulse in the pathological syndrome, but not of the symbolic transformation of these impulses. A hysterical disorder can undoubtedly be adaptive in nature. For example it can produce a reaction which helps the patient achieve a definite goal (such as the appearance of hysterical motor para-

lysis which relieves the patient of the need for activity he finds undesirable). However, to regard such a disorder as symbolical expression of a suppressed impulse is no more permissible than, let us say, to interpret ordinary behavior as a symbolic expression of normal motivation.

It can thus be granted (and as we shall see further on there are sufficient clinical and experimental grounds for this) that the pathological syndrome provoked by the conflict sometimes really does reflect the psychological content of the suppressed impulse. But we have no basis for assuming that such a manifestation of suppressed impulses results from some obligatory symbolic transformation of them.

We have dwelt in detail on the specific features of the Freudian approach to the problem of conflict because the psychoanalytical method for revealing suppressed impulses is essentially based entirely on the assumption of the existence of a process of compulsive symbolical transformation of the impulses. Having once accepted this idea, Freud seemingly should have paid serious attention to analyzing its objective laws. In actual fact however he followed an altogether different principle. In considering symbolic emotional experiences which allegedly arise both during sleep and while awake as a type of intuitive knowledge, Freud from the very first introduced into psychoanalytical technique the greatest arbitrariness of interpretation, thus depriving his method of all cogency and objectivity. His works are filled with long lists of images and explanations of their symbolical content but it is impossible to ascertain either from Freud's own works or those of his disciples on exactly what basis the psychoanalyst reaches the conclusion that a given image symbolizes a given content. Freudianism does not offer any experimental control of the hypothesis of symbolical transformation or theoretical grounds for the presumed tie between emotional experience and its symbolical expression.

* * *

The second thesis of early Freudianism is that a drive or impulse to action can become a factor influencing behavior even when it remains unconscious. Again, in discussing the problem of the conflict of impulses, we must point out the difference between the psychoanalytic interpretation of a phenomenon and the fact of the existence of this phenomenon. While we disagree with the psychoanalytic interpretation of the mechanisms of

unconscious drives, there can be no doubt whatever that unconscious emotions do exist, that they can be expressed in behavior and leave a definite impress on the dynamics of the psychological, physiological and clinical processes and, at the same time, can be connected with definite psychological content.

Pavlov, as we know from his *Clinical Wednesdays* (see the issue of June 6, 1934 and others) frequently pointed to the possibility that various complex, psychologically significant emotional experiences may become inhibited, and thus disappear from the sphere of the conscious, but without being destroyed. They are preserved for a long time in an inhibited state and may again penetrate into consciousness later on, when the inhibition is less. The Pavlov school gave an analysis of the physiological basis for this when studying the phenomena of dis-inhibition (the inhibiting of inhibition, which results in the freeing of the inhibited reactions), and many other processes of a similar type. It has been convincingly shown through clinical and experimental investigation that such unconscious emotional experiences, when inhibited, nevertheless can actively manifest themselves and leave a profound impress on the dynamics of both elementary physiological reactions and complex forms of behavior.

Data obtained by the method of delayed post-hypnotic suggestion effectively demonstrated that it is possible for a hypnotized person to retain for a considerable time intricate instructions which remain unconscious, yet are carried out under proper objective conditions. Experimental investigation along these lines includes studies of the ability to wake spontaneously from normal sleep at a definite time set beforehand; studies of the ability to accept complex verbal instructions during normal sleep and to retain them after awakening; a study of the influence exerted on the electro-encephalogram, the skin biopotentials and other autonomic indices by auditory signals lying below the threshold of audibility, a study of unconscious perception of speech during functional hearing loss; the study, during hysterical blindness, of conditioned reflex reactions evoked by light signals of various intensity, and many other works.

The data thus obtained lead to the conclusion that any theory which states that perception and certain higher forms of nervous activity connected with definite psychological content are capable of influencing behavior, whether or not the processes

themselves remain unconscious, cannot be rejected and deserves further clinical and experimental study. A most important precondition for the success of such study is an elaboration in terms of Pavlov's physiology and psychological theory of concepts regarding the mechanisms of such unconscious factors.

Before we leave our characterization of early Freudianism, we must consider one more question. What is the essence of the Freudian concept of emotional experience as an impulse to action, a sort of energy-charged vector? Is this merely a figure of speech or does it have concrete meaning?

In the first place it should be noted that Freud never even attempted to establish the precise significance of this initial concept. We stress this fact because many critics of Freudianism base their entire evaluation of the psychoanalytic concept on the indisputable vagueness of Freud's central idea. Such, for instance, is the approach of Harry K. Wells.

However, a close analysis of Wells' rather skeptical conclusions shows that he himself commits certain inaccuracies and so fails sufficiently to stress what is in effect the most profound, fundamental defect in Freudianism.

True, Freud does not offer any physiological exposition of the concept of the functional tension of impulses. As far as his later works go, this is probably due to his antiphysiologism. But he can hardly be reproached for the absence of such an explanation at the time this concept was born, since it would have been an impossibility for physiology to provide it at the end of the 19th century. Even in our day, after the discovery of so-called non-specific cortical-subcortical projections and tonic influences exerted upon various forms of higher brain activity by the reticular formation of the brain stem, the question of a physiological basis for the affective tension of emotional experience connected with concrete psychological content remains essentially obscure. Moreover we know that at the time he developed his concept of the functional tension of the impulse Freud was ideologically inspired by the materialist, not the idealist trend in neurology.

Wells' comment that Freud did not experimentally elaborate his idea about the functional tension of the impulse is essentially correct. But what matters most is not whether Freud personally did or did not participate in such experimental work but the validity of such experiments and their concrete results. In order

to find an answer to these more general questions, we must turn to the extended investigations conducted long after Freud's works were first published by researchers who had nothing in common with Freud's ideology but who were studying the same problem he did.

In spite of their interest and importance, we are unable within the limits of this article to consider these works in detail or to cite their authors. We shall confine ourselves to stating that the influences which the suppression of an impulse to action exerts on the dynamics of the psychological as well as physiological processes was convincingly demonstrated by them. We have a good example of this work in what has become known in world psychological literature as the "Zeigarnik effect," showing that the process of recall proceeds differently under conditions of completed and incompleting tasks, and that consequently memory, like many other psychological functions, greatly depends on the functional tension created by the impulse for action before it finds expression in behavior.

As regards the general conclusions that may be drawn, it may be said that the reality of functional tensions is confirmed on the basis of their active influence on behavior. Such tensions are accessible to precise experimental and clinical study even though their physiological basis is at present not fully understood. Consequently this is the only correct approach to investigating them.

To accuse Freud, as Wells does, of having based his concept on a far-fetched idea means developing criticism which is too mild. Freud's main mistake is of a much subtler, more complex and hidden nature and has to do with the role he assigned this concept within his system.

For Freud the functionally tense impulse to action is a disconnected item in the system of human behavior. The whole spiritual life of man, his entire activity, is explained according to Freud by the struggle of such instincts against the psychological factors that oppose them, factors born of the social nature of the human consciousness. In analyzing behavior Freudianism does not essentially use any other psychological categories, forever losing sight of the realistic, immeasurably more complex psychological structure of human activity which has to do, on the one hand, with the definite relationship between the motives for the act, and on the other, with the need, goal,

initial stimulus and the completed action. And because of the absence of this more profound analysis of the psychological organization of behavior, functionally tense drives are interpreted by Freud as abstract psychological vectors which float in a sort of vacuum of the consciousness (or the "subconscious"), where they can meet only forces antagonistic to them, forces of the "censor" or "super-ego" type.

With such an oversimplified, not to say vulgarized approach to the problem of the patterns of human behavior, the question of the dependence of the ultimate fate of drives on their inclusion in the more general psychological structure of the "purpose" type (in the sense ascribed to this term by D. N. Uznadze) could not in essence be included in psychoanalytic theory. Because of this, Freud was unable to explain either the major question of the dependence of the drive on the overall system of attitudes towards reality, within whose confines the given drive manifests itself, or the entire group of problems dealing with the endless possibilities for transformation of drives on the basis of their conscious connection with new psychological content and consequently without any of the mechanics of "repression."

In all fairness it must be said that Freud was twice very close to touching upon this problem, namely, during his elaboration of questions of sublimation and later when analyzing what happens when the suppressed desire is consciously recognized. It is characteristic of his approach however that he never attempted to develop his basic therapeutic thesis in depth by explaining exactly why recognition of the suppressed desire leads to recovery. There are grounds for assuming that the clinical symptoms evoked by the suppressed desire are really altered once the patient becomes conscious of it, but it is hardly possible to explain this fact without admitting that conscious recognition of the desire means its inevitable inclusion in a definite system of attitudes towards reality. This in turn helps establish a critical attitude towards the desire itself, thus profoundly changing the sum total of psychological and physiological influences which it is capable of evoking. However such interpretation was profoundly alien to Freud and it is therefore natural that he never attempted to explore it.

As regards a psychoanalytic explanation of the sublimation of instincts, here we can see with special clarity how much Freud was attracted to pseudopsychological hypotheses which

were close in spirit to the concepts of physics and Ostwaldian energetics. Sublimation, that is, the transfer of the drive to new psychological content, may be explained, according to Freud, by the mere transfer of the charge of "psychic energy" from one impulse to another. It would probably be hard to find a franker and more primitive physicalism, a more mechanistic approach to psychology.

It is impossible here to spend more time on criticism of the method of interpreting the concept of the functional tension of the impulse for action, which characterizes the psychoanalytic theory. More profound criticism must be directed to an analysis of the interrelations existing between affective impulses, behavior and attitudes as interpreted by D. N. Uznadze, and to the psychological organization of activity, but this would take us too far afield. Enough has been said, however, to substantiate what is for us the most important conclusion. The tension of the impulse for action, understood psychologically, is a concept just as scientifically valid and accessible to precise study as the idea of the pathogenicity of the conflict of drives or that of the existence of differing manifestations of unconscious drives. Each of these three general theses, however, demands its own methodologically and scientifically adequate analysis. Freudianism has been unable to supply such analysis and this is, perhaps, the chief reason for the scientific sterility of that cumbersome theoretical structure which it has erected with such stubbornness.

* * *

In summing up we may say that the history of the development of Freudianism is one of the most striking and instructive illustrations of the dependence of the fate of scientific investigation on the methodology on which it is based. It is an established fact that the earliest stage in the formation of Freud's own ideas was characterized by his adherence to the ideas of a mechanistic and physiological order. During this phase Freud posed certain problems which, if correctly developed, might have been of great scientific importance. Later however a radical change took place in his general orientation which predetermined the pseudo-scientific nature of the entire system he was to create and transformed the theory of psychoanalysis into one of the most reactionary modern bourgeois sociological and philosophical concepts.

Yet Soviet psychoneurology and psychology should not ignore the problems posed by Freud in the initial period of his

activity. It would be a mistake to assume that either the question of the psychological, physiological or clinical manifestations of unconscious factors of behavior or those of the functional tension of these affects were born of the psychoanalytical concept, or that they can be developed only on its basis. Like the problem of the pathogenic role of the conflict of impulses, they can and should be developed from the viewpoint of Pavlov's classical ideas. If we approach them in any other way a whole important group of facts prove to be essentially beyond the range of study.

Similarly we have no reasons whatever for refusing to recognize the important role of subcortical structures in the fulfillment of most complex processes of the higher nervous activity. The recognition of this role does not imply a deviation from the classical Pavlovian interpretation of the functions of the subcortex or from the concept of the functional preeminence of the cortex, which have been confirmed a thousand times. Our purpose, on the contrary, is to further develop these ideas.

Such is the general conclusion we draw from what has been said above. A methodologically distorted, idealist, pseudo-scientific interpretation has, for many years, been given to psychological problems of the unconscious and physiological problems of the participation of subcortical formations in the processes of higher nervous activity. Having refuted this interpretation, it is our task to preserve both problems for scientific analysis and to develop them on the basis of concepts which have nothing in common with the categories of Freudianism.

An Answer to F. V. Bassin's Criticism of Freudianism

By Cesare L. Musatti

Before entering into controversy with Professor F. V. Bassin regarding his article on psychoanalysis, I feel it necessary clearly and sincerely to set down my reactions to it.

I am a psychologist and I live in the Western world. For a number of years I have worked in the field of psychoanalysis,

studying it from the broadest viewpoint, without dogmatism or prejudice. I began with experimental work and my interests still center on the experimental side of psychological investigation. As regards the nature of my views and my active political work, I share Professor Bassin's ideological position.

However his article contains certain theses which in legal language might be termed inadmissible. For instance when he criticizes psychoanalysis as being in contradiction to dialectical materialism, calls it a manifestation of one of the most reactionary forms of modern bourgeois ideology and makes other similar assertions, he resorts to a method of substantiation alien to scientific polemics.

Scientific theories should be judged solely from the viewpoint of whether or not they are sound, whether they correspond to reality or are arbitrary. No other criteria can apply. Certain scientific theories are confirmed, others disproved by experiment: they are never merely progressive or reactionary. Only a theory confirmed by experimentation can be considered progressive. This, it seems to me, is the only correct dialectical approach to science.

I beg Professor Bassin to forgive me if I insist on this point, but the question is not merely a formal one. For a variety of reasons it happens to have great significance for me and my Italian colleagues.

We live in the land of Galileo. We have been through cruel and difficult struggles for the sake of secular science and we feel we must jealously guard our position, partly because we are still forced to defend it against theological interpretations. Secular science, in our understanding, develops on the basis of objective investigation independent of any generalized, biased positions, even ones which we ourselves happen to support. Were we to base our acceptance or rejection of scientific researches and explanations of facts solely on whether or not they seemed to agree with our own ideological position we would be powerless to prevent others from acting in a similar manner, whatever their point of view happened to be.

But there is yet another very special reason to which I have already alluded. In our country those who work in the psychoanalytical field are constantly being exposed to the arguments of certain conservative and clerically oriented elements which consider psychoanalysis a materialistic, atheistic, destructive doc-

trine, one which should be repudiated. Thus we see that while it means idealism to some, it is materialism to others. The conclusion is truly a strange one.

Of course, independent of any scientific evaluation of psychoanalysis such as may only be made after a study of how it corresponds to facts, the correctness of its methods and its therapeutic results, there are other questions which might be raised. For instance, might not certain of its aspects be dangerous for society—dangerous, that is, if we consider psychoanalysis not merely as the sum total of certain scientific postulates but as the basis for a whole trend in social thought, a trend that is becoming so widespread in certain countries as to become a social phenomenon? Thus, when he speaks of psychoanalysis as one of the most reactionary manifestations of modern bourgeois ideology, Professor Bassin merely means that in emphasizing the individual factors in unhappiness and psychic problems it distracts the people's attention from those contradictions which are the basis of class struggle—that in the final analysis it thereby renders a service to conservatism regardless of the value of its principles—then I personally cannot take exception to such a statement and am fully in agreement with it.

Also if my Soviet colleagues maintain that from the standpoint of the problems facing Soviet society today wide dissemination and popularization of psychoanalytic theories, such as is taking place in America, for instance, would be undesirable, then I for one shall limit myself merely to saying I am not competent to express an opinion on this matter inasmuch as I am insufficiently informed about the problems of life in Soviet society.

What I must make clear is that in our country the situation is different, that the psychoanalytic movement fulfills the function of destroying traditional ideas and concepts and that this function must be regarded as socially progressive and even revolutionary. This is so largely true and is felt to such an extent in our psychological circles that in Italy, as for that matter in the rest of West Europe, progressive psychologists and psychiatrists, including communists, widely sympathize with the psychoanalytic movement even when they do not participate in it professionally.

Whatever the case may be, all this has nothing to do with science itself. Even as regards atomic physics the question may

well be asked whether it does not serve war better than peace. Yet physicists are not responsible for the uses made of their discoveries and the question of how these are applied cannot become part of a scientific controversy regarding the intrinsic value of the theories themselves.

The field for scientific discussion having thus been cleared, let us turn to considerations of a purely scientific nature.

What Professor Bassin particularly holds against Freud is his psychologism (or antiphysiologism, if you will)—in other words, the fact that Freud uses psychological patterns and concepts instead of translating the processes of the conscious self into the language of neurophysiology.

But Bassin's viewpoint seems to me contradictory. He contrasts Freud's refusal to include physiological concepts in the system of psychoanalysis with Pavlov's refusal to include psychological concepts in the system of physiological analysis. Professor Bassin asserts that it was this refusal which led to Freud's theory of psychoanalysis becoming idealistic and unscientific.

In point of fact, it is this very parallel between Freud's refusal and Pavlov's refusal which makes it possible to understand the idea of Freudian psychologism. The attitude of both these authors is of a purely methodological nature. To Freud it does not mean denial of the significance of physiological mechanisms of the nervous system, neither is it a negation of psychic life to Pavlov.

Can it be said that Pavlov, in refusing to use psychological terminology in relation to animals, assumed the position of Descartes' materialism?

Obviously such is not the case. Pavlov spoke only of the following: we know nothing about the inner life of animals and we must set it aside and confine ourselves to an objective description of those ties which are formed between the stimulus and the reaction. The value of this method is confirmed by its results: it helped Pavlov arrive at a number of discoveries which would have been all but impossible had he tried to establish the animals' inner life, complete with images, ideas and reminiscences. These, as regards laboratory animals, can only be conjectured and cannot be objectively, accurately determined. Freud's position, although in a different field, is fully analogous.

Freud by no means denied the existence of the physiological mechanisms of the nervous system which correspond to individ-

ual psychic processes. On the contrary he definitely stated that if it were possible to determine physiological processes and their basis and to work on them, we would have much more favorable conditions both as regards theory and therapy. I should like to remind the reader of the article "Die Fragen der Laienanalyse" (1926), one of the numerous works in which Freud touches on this question.

As a result of the intimate connection existing between what we call the physical and the psychic, we can look forward to the day when not only theoretical but therapeutic means will be discovered that will lead from organic biology and chemistry to the phenomena of neuroses. But that day is still far off. Today these morbid states remain inaccessible as far as medicine is concerned.

Not only was Freud against denying physiological explanations, he was ready to accept them as soon as this proved feasible. Freud's refusal, like Pavlov's, is never theoretical in its essence and does not imply any metaphysical concepts. Some years ago, in 1938, I developed this thesis in an article entitled, "Les courants de la psychologie contemporaine dans leurs fondements méthodiques."

In that article psychoanalysis, Pavlov's theory of conditioned reflexes and other trends in modern psychology are presented as varying paths of investigation, all of which continue to develop regardless of differing methodological points of view and which are prompted by the specific nature of the facts with which psychology deals. It is strange that Bassin on the one hand interprets Freud's position as a metaphysical one and ascribes the degeneration of his ideas into idealism to his refusal to go along with physiological concepts, and on the other recognizes the methodological nature of this refusal when he ascribes to Freud the conviction that "inasmuch as we know little about the physiological mechanisms of the brain, psychological theory must be elaborated independently of physiology." But several pages later he admits the validity of Freud's methodological position when in speaking of the concept of functional tension of the impulse, or the charge of energy connected with drives, he declares that Freud cannot be blamed for insufficient physiological explanations inasmuch as he was limited by the potential of psychology at the end of the 19th century. Even in our day, after the discovery of so-called non-specific cortical and

subcortical projections, the question of a physiological basis for the affective tension of emotional experience connected with concrete psychological content remains vague.

Thus Freud, whose investigations were concentrated within a definite, specific sphere, could not have acted otherwise. The question is, was his method valid and did it or did it not produce results?

Bassin considers that what is most characteristic for the first phase of Freud's investigations is the thesis that the drives to action become pathological when they encounter resistance and their fulfillment becomes impossible. This thesis is part of another more general one, which regards conflict between drives or desires as pathological.

Bassin finds this thesis admissible. True, he arrives at his conclusion not by recognizing psychoanalytical experimentation, but on the basis of external evidence—investigations by the Pavlovian school. Yet whatever the case may be, this thesis of Freud's is accepted by him.

We find uncertainty and a number of contradictions in Bassin in connection with his understanding of the pathological action of the inhibited impulse. We refer here to a principle that is of basic significance for an understanding of Freud's concepts and of the entire development of psychoanalysis, namely, the specific character of neurotic symptoms.

Where does Bassin stand on this question? On the one hand he disagrees with the idea that the symptom "not only arises as a result of repression of one's desires but expresses the desire in acceptable, symbolic form." He maintains that clinical experiments show that what most often comes about are non-specific modifications "which are in no way connected with the psychological content of the conflict."

He also says that although Freud grasped the pathogenic significance of affective conflicts more than half a century ago, he was nevertheless unable to utilize the obvious potential advantages contained in this concept because of its "fundamental antiphysiology."

Yet Bassin also recognizes the existence, even if rare, of definite cases when there is a definite connection between the functional disturbance arising from conflict and the psychological content of the conflict itself. For this reason the sum total of the pathological symptoms provoked by the conflict in fact

reflects the psychic content of the repressed desire. Thus in special cases he accepts a psychological interpretation of the symptom, in other words, an interpretation based on Freud's antiphysiologism which he himself had condemned.

Professor Bassin's position resembles the position of Pierre Janet who, at the time of publication of *L'Automatisme psychologique* in 1889, i.e., before Freud and Breuer published their joint investigations, described several clinical case histories in which the patients' hysterical symptoms reproduced elements of whatever had caused the trauma. Later, Janet in his polemics with Freud wrote that this referred to *very rare exceptions* and that in the main hysterical symptoms were not specific and lacked all psychological meaning.

Aside from any other considerations, we must recognize the theoretical weakness of a position which accepts two absolutely different types of processes as the basis for neurotic symptoms, of which some can be described psychologically inasmuch as the conflict is reducible to symptoms which express it while others cannot be described at all because the symptoms have no obvious connection with the essence of the conflict. Freud's theory is much more logical. According to this theory, in cases where a symptom seemingly has no meaning, it can be explained solely by the fact that we have not yet ascertained that meaning.

Bassin asserts that Freud invented a special method of intuitive recognition and that from the very beginning he introduces into psychoanalytical method unlimited freedom of interpretation, thus depriving it of all objectivity. This objection has been raised against psychoanalysis time and again. We shall return to it later.

Here we should like to draw attention to what Freud himself as well as others with personal experience in psychoanalytical investigation have always stressed. There is no such thing in actual fact as freedom of interpretation. The psychoanalytical method has its obligatory aspects for those who make use of it, although in this as in every other field mistakes are of course possible. The greatest danger when using this method is not that one may see too much but rather that one may fail to see something.

The general principle of the symbolic nature of neurotic symptoms is theoretically justified in Freud's system even

when abstracted from concrete evidence. The symptom not only resembles the conflict which evokes it but in a certain sense expresses this conflict and makes attempts to solve it, though these attempts are of a compromising, inadequate nature, and naturally enough fail to lead to the real resolution of the conflict.

Bassin makes no mention of the book *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*. There he would find this concept developed and explained. He devotes several pages to yet another argument—the unconscious nature of conflict. Here too he has many reservations. He says first of all that psychoanalytical interpretation of the mechanisms of the functioning of unconscious drives raises the same objections. But he grants that unconscious emotional experiences may be expressed in behavior and leave a definite impress on the dynamics of psychic, physiological and clinical processes. This admission is of great significance. Bassin rightly thinks that this thesis can be substantiated by research other than psychoanalytical experiment and in this connection he refers both to numerous works on hypnosis and to the work of the Georgian psychological school of Uznadze.

These references strike me as being most important. As I have said, I arrived at psychoanalysis by way of experimental psychology and am therefore particularly sensitive to possibilities of laboratory experiments for checking processes which psychoanalytic experiment encounters in difficult clinical cases.

We must admit that some analysts consider such experimental checkup useless. They rely fully on their own analytical experience. But such a position has always made it difficult to establish rapport between the analysts and the psychologists who lack this experience. It is my opinion that it would be well to find external evidence (possibly experimental, for this can be repeated and exactly checked at will) of those processes with which the analyst must deal and which he regularly observes and uses.

Outstanding psychoanalysts did just that at the beginning of the century.* My own *Leçons de psychanalyse* (1933,1934) and *Trattato di psicoanalisi* (1949) explore precisely such evidence as regards impulses to action which have become unconscious, utilizing experiments in post-hypnotic suggestion, in which I personally took part and to which Bassin refers.

I should like to point out to him that had he conducted such

*Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, London, 1913.

experiments himself, making use of suggestions which are inadmissible to the person being examined—suggestions which during their fulfillment meet special inner defenses and resistance on the part of the entire personality—he would have had an opportunity to show experimentally, or independently of what in his opinion is the psychoanalyst's arbitrary assertion, the direct association between symptoms and the unconscious conflict. In contrast to what we see when suggestions encounter no special subjective resistance, post-hypnotic suggestion which evokes inner resistance does not lead to carrying out the action after the subject is awake or after the time limit set by the experimenter is over. It also arouses, as Jones noted, a conflict situation which is usually unconscious inasmuch as the subject is unaware of his inner impulse and does not suspect its origin. It ends in incongruous, unjustified behavior accompanied by a feeling of alarm. All of this adds up to a real experimental symptom which resembles the symptoms of neurotic obsessions or phobias. The conflict is expressed in very specific symptoms with definitely significant symbolism. If Bassin accepts experiments connected with post-hypnotic suggestions as adequate proof of the influence which unconscious drives exert on the behavior of the individual, then he should also accept experiments with inadmissible suggestions as sufficient objective proof that in unconscious conflict symptoms manifest themselves in the form of suggestions, exactly as psychoanalysis claims they do.

The other group of experimental works to which Bassin refers deals with the real influence that inhibition of drives or delay in fulfillment of suggestions has on the dynamics of the psychological and physiological processes. I refer to that body of research which Americans call experimental psychodynamics. Research of this type has also been conducted by Soviet psychologists. Special mention must be made of the works of Zeigarnik which make a considerable contribution to the study of processes of this kind, processes which spontaneously manifest themselves in the phenomenology of psychoneurosis and also find confirmation in psychoanalysis.

Bassin hastens to say that psychoanalysis, by reducing all impulses to several abstract psychological vectors that function in a vacuum of consciousness (or the subconscious), becomes incapable of finding correct approaches to the problems of man's

behavior patterns. But here Bassin is not sufficiently clear and it is difficult to follow his meaning. The impression is created that after concentrating on the first stage of Freud's activity Bassin then jumps to what he calls the fourth phase of psychoanalysis, or to what followed Freud. He completely ignores the development and progressive transformation of Freud's own ideas of the theory of human personality. All this is particularly obvious in connection with Bassin's statements on the process of recovery which takes place when repressed desire is consciously recognized. The words he uses in criticizing over-simplified methods of interpreting the effects of recovery resulting from repressed impulses rising to the level of consciousness are almost a reiteration of the words written by Freud in 1914 in his article, "Recollecting, Repeating and Working Through," in which he notes certain modifications already achieved at that time in analytical techniques which made it possible to establish more exact and concrete interrelations between repressed impulses and the personality of the patient as a whole. It is therefore very strange to read in 1958, or 44 years later, that this method of approach is so far from Freud's own that he never even attempted to develop it. Of course, this article is not an isolated work. Everything that Freud and others after him have written on questions of method presents the process of recovery in a light vastly different from the old principles of catharsis.

In any case, if Bassin is interested in experimental proof of the process of catharsis (which can be studied only in certain specific, very limited situations), he should refer to the experiments with inadmissible post-hypnotic orders which we have already mentioned. The experimental neurotic symptom which has been induced vanishes automatically as soon as the patient who has been freed of his hypnotic state is asked to recall and retain the suggestion made to him in his recent hypnotic state, which, forgotten, evoked unconscious conflict.

Bassin searches in spheres alien to psychoanalysis for experimental proof of certain theses advanced by Freud. This method, which he uses with some reluctance, must be recognized as useful. Bassin would do well to employ it also in relation to techniques of psychoanalytical interpretation, which as we have seen impress him as arbitrary and insufficiently objective. He should have begun with the very basis of analysis—free association. Investigation of the processes of the essence of the un-

conscious is not based, as he thinks, on symbolical interpretation (which is merely an auxiliary means and should be used with moderation and caution) but is on the contrary founded on the method of association. It would be important to know whether Bassin finds this method admissible. In order to gauge its value outside the realm of psychoanalysis, he might refer either to *Diagnostische Assoziation Studien* by Jung, itself an application of *Psychologische Tatbestandsdiagnostik* by Wertheimer and Klein, i.e., of the classical experimental method, or to all those projective technique methods which have been widely developed for years, beginning with Rorschach. He could also investigate the many methods which in the West have become part of clinical psychology: these consist of a systematic collection of indices, the aim of which is to reveal man's profound and latent psychological realities.

Bassin states that he admits the existence of unconscious processes and unconscious content. He should tell us how he proposes to learn anything at all about this content, inasmuch as to speak of unconscious elements without suggesting some method which would make it possible to recognize them is tantamount to assuming a truly metaphysical position.

As regards symbolical interpretations towards which Bassin is so hostile, I should like to make a personal admission. When I first began to study psychoanalysis I had just as great an aversion to symbolical interpretation as Professor Bassin. Perhaps that is best explained by the fact that I had been an experimental researcher. I might even add that I still retain this aversion. While it is a fact constantly confirmed by analytic experiment that the unconscious expresses itself symbolically, when we try on the basis of the simplest symbolism to pinpoint actual symbolical significance—as for instance in the case of dreams—then, in the absence of other evidence I am always afraid to proceed too lightly.

From the very beginning I set myself the task of finding approaches which would permit me definitely to prove the symbolic significance of particular elements. In order to achieve this I worked with groupings of recurrent dreams which the same person had had in different guise over a relatively short period of time. Assuming that all these dreams had some common meaning, I proceeded as one does when studying ancient letters or a series of documents in which an unknown word recurs several

times. One must find the meaning of this word and insert it in context; thus its significance can be understood. I named this process, which seemed to me trustworthy, convergent analysis.*

It should be noted that no matter how different were individual interpretations of the symbolic material of the unconscious, convergent analysis proves them amazingly analogous. The language of the unconscious, for all of its variants, is common for all. The material of images, impulses, desires which we find in different people is in the main alike.

Symbolic interpretation calls for great care and must not be done mechanically, in addition to which its basis must be looked for in the main process of trend of associations. Professor Bassin notwithstanding, this interpretation is far from arbitrary.

As far back as the beginning of our century psychoanalysts have studied the very processes of symbolization, i.e., the concrete process of transforming a definite idea or image into the corresponding symbolical idea. In this connection let us refer to the studies of dreams evoked during hypnosis, those conducted by Schrötter and especially also Silberer's observations regarding so-called *functional phenomena*. I myself have studied this question and have given several descriptions of these phenomena.**

Bassin fails to take into consideration external evidence of the process of symbolization, nor does he in my opinion have a clear grasp of the function of symbolism. It seems to him impossible that unconscious psychic activity might fully transfer to the symbols themselves certain genuine emotional reactions, that the symbols in this relation might be fully equivalent to an unknown meaning.

This difficulty in understanding symbolical images is explained by the fact that no distinction is made between what is symbolical for the unconscious and what appears so to our conscious mind. Thus to our consciousness the flag is a symbol of the motherland, and an insult to it may be felt like an insult to the motherland. Yet no soberminded adult can forget that the flag is a piece of fabric. As regards symbols created for our unconscious psychic activity, the situation is different. These symbols do not merely indicate the objects whose symbols they

* *Trattato di psicoanalisi*, Vol. 1, pp. 244ff.

** *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 240.

are; they not only evoke and designate them but become their actual equivalents. To make a clear analogy let us consider the psyche of the child. In children's games every symbol can become a superb equivalent of reality. Unconscious psychic activity may be equated with the rudiments of the infantile psyche which continues to manifest itself in an adult.

Professor Bassin in his analysis dwells on what is called the first period in the development of Freudian thought. He quickly disposes of several successive periods as if they represented a sum total of arbitrary hypotheses.

As with every scientific technique, psychoanalysis contains certain elements which are the direct result of research and others derived from purely theoretical study, but based on and confirmed by investigation. It is fully logical to assume that these have the significance of hypotheses and are freely discussed among psychoanalysts. Furthermore some of them, while in the nature of hypotheses, may be used as directing principles to advance analytical work. It goes without saying that we must be very careful and even skeptical of them whenever they are claimed to be in exact conformity with reality. The therapeutic aims of psychoanalysis often make one act according to the "as if" principle.

Among psychoanalysts there are those who are cautious, always distinguishing between what one may speak of with certainty and what is hypothetical—Freud for one always made this distinction. But there are also those who are not cautious enough. However even here the danger is not too great. Several years ago exact models were the fashion in the physical sciences. Although they were treated as the real thing, practice did not always justify this. As investigation progressed, some of these models proved to be genuine replicas of the real situation, others had to be discarded. But their construction was always justifiable in terms of scientific quests inasmuch as they helped advance research. Obviously it would be incorrect to accuse the scientists who built the models of being idealist metaphysicians. They developed them merely for the purpose of systematizing certain factors.

In any case it would be impossible on the basis of Bassin's article to get a clear concept of the science of psychoanalysis as a whole inasmuch as he confines himself to consideration of only the first period of the development of Freud's theory.

Yet in spite of the first impression his article gives, it seems to me his analysis is of very great importance. I have already mentioned several statements, which I hesitate to regard as directed against a living science; I prefer to consider them as slogans such as are frequently repeated in the USSR in relation to psychoanalysis simply because it is a trend alien to Soviet psychological tradition. If we overlook the significance of statements of this sort, we must admit that Bassin's article contains many positive statements. It is important that the discussion concern itself more and more with concrete problems. Certainly the article contains the elements necessary for this.

I recall the special attention Bassin paid to certain findings with which he had just become acquainted. I must say that we in the West should in turn study the work of Soviet psychologists, about whom we know too little. For instance Bassin frequently refers to the work of Uznadze and his school as a trend in concrete psychological research which might well be balanced against psychoanalysis. I feel this would be of great value to us.

A Rejoinder to Professor Musatti

By F. V. Bassin

Professor Musatti begins his article by saying that he would like to explain frankly the general impression my ideas made on him. His main point is that some of the ways I have of expressing ideas are, "speaking in legal language . . . inadmissible" to him. Professor Musatti then gives his arguments explaining exactly why he feels compelled to assume the position he does.

The first argument runs as follows: scientific concepts, Professor Musatti says, may be evaluated on the basis of one criterion only—their conformity or non-conformity to reality. There can be no progressive or reactionary scientific theories, but only theories which are confirmed or contradicted by experiment; in his opinion there is no other method of evaluating scientific theory. Professor Musatti substantiates this idea with words which reflect his sincere conviction: "The question . . .

happens to have great significance for me and my Italian colleagues. . . . We live in the land of Galileo. . . ."

I should like to reply to this first argument before proceeding to a consideration of the second. It seems to me we shall be able to come to a mutual understanding on this question, for Professor Musatti's general ideological views, as is apparent from the very first lines of his article, are close to the spirit of dialectical materialism, even if they do not completely coincide with that philosophy.

I should like first of all to express my full agreement with Professor Musatti in that an evaluation of a scientific concept on the basis of conformity or non-conformity of its conclusions to objective reality is indisputably one of the most important or, to be more exact, the only criterion possible. Where then do I differ with Professor Musatti? I submit that there are at least two different ways of evaluating a scientific theory. One is from the standpoint of its intrinsic truth, the other from the point of the role it plays in the history of culture and society. These two means of interpretation (and that is the root of the matter) are not always interrelated in any fixed way. Some theories are false and exert no influence on science at the time they come under discussion. For instance, the theories of phlogiston and ether are today just as false as they are dead. There are today many such theories which, though profoundly false, nevertheless—and I hardly need explain to a supporter of the philosophy of historical materialism exactly why this is so!—continue to play a tremendous role in cultural and social life, helping only to push mankind backward, not forward. This is what we mean when we say they are reactionary. The term "reactionary" is not to be confused with the term "false." It implies not only "non-conformity of idea to fact" but our belief that theory is a factor in the social process, and so has a historical role which cannot at any given moment be predetermined by its truthfulness or falsity.

To give up the right to make evaluations would mean an inexcusable impoverishment of our ideas. Let us not forget how long many theories survived despite the fact that they were known to be false, and how much suffering they brought about. Indeed, the descendants of the great Italians, giants and martyrs of the Renaissance, have less need than anyone to be reminded of this.

I therefore think that Professor Musatti is wrong in saying that the concept of the reactionary character of a scientific theory is "inadmissible." His argumentation is far too academic. It ignores the fact that theory is not merely a generalization based on experiment but has a historical destiny. When we say that a theory is reactionary or progressive, it means we look at it as a specific expression of social ideology. I could not renounce such an approach without simultaneously renouncing the principles of my world outlook. I feel, by the way, that given these explanations Professor Musatti may possibly agree with the correctness of my position.

Professor Musatti's second point is that Soviet science is not alone in disapproving of psychoanalysis. Bourgeois-conservative and clerical circles as well as spiritualists of all sorts regard it as a materialist, anti-religious and destructive doctrine. He does not develop his thought to the end, but what he seems to say is that if the representatives of opposing ideologies simultaneously accuse Freudianism of being reactionary, materialist and atheist in character, this is evidence of the unfairness of each of these accusations taken separately.

It seems to me that such a view of this peculiar "mutual neutralization" of accusations is hardly convincing. We know that an ideological struggle has been going on in sharp form for centuries not only between the representatives of idealist and materialist trends but between individual idealist schools as well. If the modern neo-Thomists regard the theories of modern logical positivists or adherents of the semantic philosophy as some sort of anti-religious and materialist philosophy, does that make the concepts of George Moore, Bertrand Russell and Alfred Whitehead closer to the views of Engels? It is sufficient to pose the question to see the weakness of the argument that criticism of psychoanalysis from the right neutralizes criticism from the left. The claims of militant fideism have no logical connection with the criticism of Freudianism made by Soviet investigators. Therefore Professor Musatti cannot in principle use them, even indirectly, in defense of psychoanalysis.

I should like to call Professor Musatti's attention to the fact that the critical Soviet attitude towards psychoanalysis, which he is right in noting, does not at all stem from a biased, unmotivated, negative position. We remember numerous concrete critical works devoted to analysis—and condemnation—of

Freudianism in the twenties and thirties. If later this concrete criticism stopped, it was because the evolution of the psychoanalytic concept with its encroachment into the field of sociological problems so sharply emphasized the non-scientific and, if Professor Musatti will forgive me, reactionary character of all of Freud's theses that it became pointless for Soviet investigators to continue arguing with his supporters. Soviet psychological literature has firmly maintained an overwhelmingly negative attitude towards Freudianism. But it is an attitude based on clearly formulated theoretical grounds and cannot be countered by statements of spiritualists regarding the materialist nature of psychoanalysis. It is characteristic that the recent marked increase in negative attitudes towards Freudianism outside the Soviet Union (I have in mind such works as those of Harry K. Wells, especially his fundamental monograph *Pavlov and Freud*, and the contributions of Mette, Furst, Muller-Hege-mann, Michalova, Feld'eshi, O'Connor and many others) in fact indicates a further development and deepening of scientific criticism of psychoanalysis, whose logical roots stem from studies conducted several decades ago by Soviet authors.

All in all it must be said that Professor Musatti's demand that the epithet "reactionary" not be applied to the theory of psychoanalysis inasmuch as it violates strictly a scientific discussion, though categorical in the beginning, softened considerably in the pages that followed. Indeed, his very next admission is indicative of such a change.

Professor Musatti admits that various questions may be raised in regard to psychoanalytic theory. Does it not for instance contain certain aspects which are socially negative and dangerous? If Bassin, he continues, when speaking of the reactionary character of psychoanalysis simply wishes to stress that in accentuating the significance of the subjective factors of suffering, analysis distracts the people's attention from the social conflicts underlying the class struggle and thereby—regardless of the truth of its theses—indirectly renders a service to conservatism, then "I personally cannot take exception to this and am fully in agreement with his opinion."

I am happy to note these words. And I would like to call Professor Musatti's attention to the fact that in many respects they coincide with those I once used to describe one of the reasons for the favorable attitude of certain circles in the USA

towards psychoanalysis. I shall permit myself to quote the following: "The basic reasons for this favorable attitude are to be found in the tendency of Freudianism to explain the affective tensions and negative emotions not as stemming from the difficulties of life itself, from class exploitation which, as Maxim Gor'kii put it, gives rise 'to the entire absurdity, filth and abomination of the capitalist system,' but first of all as repression of biologically determined drives. There is no need to point out to what degree such disregard of the social nature of affects is acceptable to the bourgeois world outlook. . . ."

Having thus admitted that in a certain sense it is correct to speak of the reactionary nature of psychoanalysis, Professor Musatti continues to argue as follows:

Psychoanalysis, in his opinion, is a progressive trend in Italy, even a revolutionary one (I am glad to note that he considers it permissible in principle to use this term when speaking of a scientific theory!). In substantiation of this statement he points to the widespread recognition which psychoanalytic concepts enjoy among progressive social groups in Italy, including the Communists. At the same time he considers it valid to draw analogies between the situation in psychoanalysis and that in atomic physics, where the same scientific discoveries may be utilized in the interests of war as well as of peace without the authors being in any way responsible.

While I respect the first argument—the popularity of psychoanalysis among Italy's progressive circles—and realize it is a social fact which we must take into consideration, I cannot regard it as one which compels me to justify Freudianism.

If Professor Musatti feels psychoanalysis can play a reactionary role by distracting attention from the real reasons for social calamities under capitalism, is this not as true of Italy as elsewhere? I am not sufficiently well acquainted with Italian social reality, but it seems to me that so long as the basic features of the bourgeois system remain, the possibility of certain harmful influences of psychoanalytic teachings, influences which are specific to capitalism, will also remain.

The comparison with the situation in the field of physics is even less convincing. The origin of the concepts of atomic physics was in no way connected with an analysis of social phenomena. Only the application of these concepts has become

* Bulletin of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR, No. 1, 1959, p. 98.

a weapon of social practice and its application is indeed in equal degree available to representatives of opposing ideologies. That is a truism. But is this the case as regards psychoanalysis? Would anyone acquainted with its history agree that the creation of the psychoanalytic doctrine was in no way connected with an analysis of the social and historical processes? Is the entire cycle of Freud's sociological works of a later date, the entire development of Freudianism into a specific philosophy or even into a specific reason, as Professor Musatti himself puts it, "for a whole trend in social thought"—is this only a mechanical application in social science of an available doctrine which sociologists are able to twist about? I believe it is enough merely to pose the question to see how strained and arbitrary is the interpretation defended by Professor Musatti.

It is not mere accident that Professor Musatti does not dwell upon the evaluation given in my article of those very phases in the development of Freud's teachings, characteristic of which is the attention given to questions of a sociological order, questions which concern the culture of primitive society and the role which according to Freud seemingly innate instincts of death and destruction play in the life of modern civilized society. No one will attempt to deny the profound inner tie between these later works and the entire previous development of Freud's teachings. This means not merely that psychoanalysis is "used" in sociology as a primary, neutral weapon and that such utilization may be applied in various ways and from various sociological positions; it means that it *has created its own sociology*, its own profoundly characteristic approach to an interpretation of social phenomena, an approach whose logical roots extend to the very heart of the psychoanalytic doctrine. It is for this very reason that the analogy with the situation in physics is an absolutely wrong one. It could not arrive at any other sociological conclusions than those to which Freudianism has actually arrived, and it cannot produce any other sociology than the one it has already created. Any other point of view is artificial, cannot be substantiated and obviously underestimates the logical harmony of the entire system of ideas created by Freud.

* * *

If I have dwelt in such detail on an analysis of the general theses given above, it is because otherwise I would have been

unable to reply to the first part of Professor Musatti's article, which touches upon questions of an ideological nature. I shall now deal with those critical arguments which directly concern Freud's theory.

The first of these has to do with questions of Freud's principle of psychologism (or antiphysiologism). Professor Musatti disagrees with my position that it was because of his "methodologically fallacious attempts to build up the theory of the activity of the brain under conditions which ignored the physiological theory of the brain mechanisms" that Freud could not possibly arrive at any other but ideological and pseudoscientific conclusions. Objecting to this statement, Professor Musatti elaborates his idea as follows:

Just as Pavlov excluded elements of the psychological from his system of concepts, so did Freud exclude elements of the physiological. In both cases, however, this was neither more nor less than an expression of a definite method of investigation, a definite scientific strategy which happened to be the most advantageous at a given stage of development. By no means was it a metaphysical denial of the existence of the processes of another modality. Just as Pavlov did not deny the existence and importance of the psyche, Professor Musatti writes, so Freud did not deny the existence and importance of physiological processes. Each preferred to use only one of two possible methods of analysis of the activity of the brain, considering it premature at the given level of development of his science to use both approaches simultaneously. Further on Professor Musatti says: "It is strange that Bassin on the one hand interprets Freud's position as a metaphysical one and ascribes the degeneration of his ideas into idealism to his refusal to go along with physiological concepts, and on the other recognizes the methodological nature of this refusal. . . ."

In this connection I would like to say I am surprised that Professor Musatti considers my interpretation of Freud's position, which essentially denies the existence of processes of any modality other than psychological, as a "metaphysical" one. My article contains no such assertion. On the contrary, it twice clearly states that this denial expressed his basic methodological position, one which was wrong in principle and which therefore eventually led Freudianism into the blind alley of idealism. I therefore submit that the accusation that I was logically incon-

sistent is unfounded. Secondly, I should like to point out that Professor Musatti inaccurately characterizes Freud's position on questions of the physiological mechanism of brain activity. Professor Musatti would have been right had Freud's analysis actually remained within the sphere of psychological concepts. But we know that at least twice in his life Freud attempted, on the basis of his psychological concepts, to build a picture of the physiological mechanisms of the functioning of the brain which was completely fantastic and pseudoscientific.

Freud's antiphysiologism was therefore not an outright metaphysical denial of the existence of nerve elements or the significance of their ties (how can one even ascribe such a naive position to a man who was one of the best educated neuropathologists of his generation!). It was far more subtle and intricate in character. On the one hand it deliberately excluded the possibility of recognition of the ties between psychological and physiological processes and with it the possibility of recognition of the influences exerted upon the dynamics of psychological processes by factors of a physiological nature. On the other hand, seemingly as a means of dealing with the frightening, paradoxical gap apparent between the mind and its material substratum, it established laws of a physiological order as directly embodying, in material and spatial form, the hypothetic structure of psychological processes (see *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and other works by Freud). Such an approach deprived Freud's entire system of the possibility of basing itself on genuinely scientific ideas regarding the mechanisms of brain activity and inevitably pushed it into the field of physiological fantasy and philosophical idealism.

With Freud's position interpreted in this way, it becomes clear that the quotation cited by Professor Musatti from criticism by Harry K. Wells, to the effect that it would be unfair to demand of Freud more than 19th century physiology could give, can in no way be used to justify Freud's overall position. Even if it was impossible to solve certain basic problems concretely at that time, it does not mean that a *general* rejection of all physiological interpretations is correct. Not even in our day are the physiological approaches to all psychological problems entirely clear. But could this circumstance justify a general rejection of such approaches?

It therefore seems to me that Professor Musatti describes

the entire problem of Freud's attitudes towards physiology rather inaccurately and in a somewhat simplified way.

I shall now turn to another question which Professor Musatti rightly considers significant for a correct understanding of Freud's ideas—the question of the tie between pathological syndromes and the affective conflicts or suppressed impulses on which they are based.

Professor Musatti characterizes my position on this question as follows: he points out that while I recognize the existence of disturbances which, though provoked by affective conflict, are in no way connected with its psychological content, I do not exclude the considerably rarer cases in which a definite logical tie can be noted between the character of the functional changes which have taken place under the influence of the conflict and its psychological content. Professor Musatti considers that this interpretation is similar to Pierre Janet's.

In evaluating this position Professor Musatti considers it weak if only for its potential dualism: an assumption of the existence of two absolutely opposing forms of pathogenesis of neurotic symptoms, one which may be psychologically interpreted, another which has nothing in common with such an interpretation. He considers Freud's monistic point of view much more convincing. According to this viewpoint, a symptom which seems to us to have no psychological meaning actually does possess such meaning and merely shows our inability to find it.

I should like to introduce some clarity here inasmuch as Professor Musatti has not presented my understanding of the matter entirely correctly.

In my article I did emphasize that "the experience in a clinic for diversified disorders shows that often we have to do with non-specific changes which are in no way connected with the psychological content of the conflict." However, when saying this I had in mind not neurotic disorders alone. The experiences of M. K. Petrova and many other scientists of the Pavlov school, as well as the research of a number of Soviet clinicians, demonstrated that under conditions of conflict between processes of excitation and inhibition (that specific physiological model of the conflict of affects) profound disturbances may arise not only in conditioned-reflex activity but also in the vital autonomic functions which in the end lead to serious organic pathology.

In the light of this research, affective conflict appears as a factor capable of provoking the most diverse disturbances. A serious argument in favor of the psychological non-specificity of such psychogenically conditioned disturbances is the fact, confirmed a thousand times both experimentally and clinically, that the character of such disturbances depends to a tremendous degree on the functional state of the physiological systems at the moment the conflict arises. When there is a selective weakness in a physiological system, this system becomes most involved in the pathological process, regardless of what the concrete psychological content of the conflict may be. This, it seems to me, convincingly testifies to the fact that here we have the leading clinical factor in organic pathology, as well as in functional disturbances which cannot be associated with hysteria.

On the contrary, as far as the clinical picture of hysteria is concerned, we do indeed often see cases where a definite logical tie exists between the nature of the disturbance and the psychological content of the emotions of the patient preceding the disturbance. However I am unable to understand the reasons which prompt Professor Musatti to try *a priori* to apply these relation schemes to an infinite number of cases in which the most painstaking analysis reveals no such logical ties. This approach impresses me as having a touch of dogmatism and I definitely prefer the position which, upon analysis of so specific a clinical phenomenon as hysteria, admits of the existence of definite peculiarities in the mechanisms of the pathogenesis of hysterical disturbances. Monistic interpretations are of course impressive, but they should not be confused with a tendency to unify interpretations, a tendency which frequently conceals only subordination to a preconceived idea.

Do we then have any concrete ideas about the physiological mechanisms which can arouse in the hysterical patient the appearance of clinical symptoms such as paralysis or anesthesia, symptoms which have a *logical connection* with his affective emotion? Undoubtedly this question can be answered in the affirmative on the basis of the ideas expressed by I. P. Pavlov in his article, "Attempts at a Physiological Understanding of the Symptomatology of Hysteria." I shall take the liberty of quoting the basic idea developed in this work.

"The hysterical person often can and should be thought of, even in ordinary life situations, as a person chronically hypno-

tized to a certain degree . . . inhibiting symptoms can appear in the hysterical hypnotic through suggestion and auto-suggestion. . . . In view of the emotional nature of the hysterical person, any notion about the inhibiting effect due to fear, *interest or gain* (underscoring mine—F.V.B.), just as the word of the hypnotizer in hypnosis, evokes and establishes these symptoms for a long time, until at last a stronger wave of excitation . . . destroys these inhibited zones. We do not have sufficient basis for saying that in a given case there is deliberate simulation of the symptoms. It is rather a case of physiological relations.”*

It is hardly necessary to stress to what extent this explanation of the physiological mechanisms which condition the appearance of symptoms that have obvious “logical meaning” differs from psychoanalytical interpretations. In the light of this it is evident how wrong Professor Musatti is in considering that the recognition of a logical tie between the conflict and the symptom is incompatible with the recognition of a physiological tie between them. The chief advantage of the Pavlov approach here lies in the fact that it enables one to understand the existence of logical connections as based on definite laws of a physiological order. And it is this advantage which the psychoanalytical interpretation lacks in essence.

There is another factor which Professor Musatti touches upon when discussing the ties between the syndrome and the conflict. That is the question of the degree of substantiation of the interpretations arising as a result of psychoanalytic investigation. After mentioning that my article stresses the arbitrariness of these interpretations which deprived the psychoanalytic method of all objectivity, Professor Musatti rejects my approach. However, he fails to substantiate his own position with concrete argumentation. I am therefore unable to dispute this question with him.

As for the statement that not only can the hysterical syndrome resemble the conflict which provoked it but can also express in peculiar pathological form the striving to solve it, I doubt if there is any dispute with Professor Musatti here, and his reference to Freud's work *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* is fully appropriate. If hysterical paralysis appears in the patient, freeing him of the need for activity which in a

* I. P. Pavlov, *Complete Collected Works*, Publishing House of Academy of Sciences of USSR, 1951, Vol. 3, Part 2, pp. 209-211.

definite situation would be undesirable, we of course have every reason to regard such a disturbance as a peculiar reaction of pathological adaptation and we must base all our therapeutic tactics on such a supposition. However, it is my understanding that this interpretation and these tactics should be regarded least of all as part of the psychoanalytic credo. Pavlov's words, quoted above, in regard to the tie between the hysterical symptom and the patient's "interest" or "gain" speak convincingly of this.

On the subject of an analysis of questions of the manifestation of unconscious impulses towards action, Professor Musatti separates himself from those Freudians who consider as superfluous experimental corroboration of the basic principles of psychoanalytic teachings. This, of course, can only be welcomed. Professor Musatti points out that he arrived at psychoanalysis from experimental psychology and that he himself in his day conducted experimental investigations by methods of suggestion. He paid special attention to post-hypnotic suggestion, during which instructions are retained and fulfilled while the patient remains unconscious. In this connection he calls attention to the well-known fact that instructions whose fulfillment is incompatible with the moral principles or established affective attitudes of the hypnotized person are usually not manifested in his behavior. Their manifestation is replaced by the development of conditions which in many respects resemble neuroses, phobias, etc. This is indeed the case, and even in the early literature dealing with problems of hypnosis attention was frequently called to this circumstance. Professor Musatti assumes that such experiments convincingly show that unconscious affective conflicts are capable of provoking the appearance of clinical symptoms—that they bear out, as he assumes, psychoanalytical interpretation.

In this connection I should like to point out certain facts which may help shed more light on the essence of the question under discussion. There is no doubt whatever (and this was clearly stated in my original article) that many studies have already described the many-sided objective influences on the dynamics of psychological and physiological functions and also on clinical manifestations exerted by elementary and complex stimuli and auditory instructions which are not consciously perceived by the person whom they influence. It is these which

have furnished grounds to speak of "unconscious sensations," unconscious but psychologically meaningful emotions, etc. However, such terminology is not sufficiently precise from the philosophical and psychological point of view.

It seems to me we will be much more consistent if for the traditional but inherently contradictory concept of "unconscious sensation" we substitute the concept of special, automatic activity of the consciousness. There are at least two reasons for this. First, if we speak of "sensations" or "emotional experiences" which remain unconscious, it is inevitable that the question must arise of the object of these sensations or experiences. This obviously can only be some "lower" form of consciousness, something in the nature of the "unconscious" or "subconscious," as opposed to clear consciousness. Thus by the very fact of permitting the use of the term "unconscious sensation" we inevitably if involuntarily are caught up in that circle of concepts so profoundly characteristic of psychoanalytical thought.

Second, if we use the term "automatic activity of consciousness" we stress interpretation of consciousness as an attitude (let us recall Marx's formula about consciousness as "my attitude towards my surroundings"), which remains even in those cases when, due to special pathological or experimental conditions, the subjective "emotions" connected with the attitude temporarily disappear. In such cases the automatic activity of consciousness retains the symptoms of adaptation activity despite the fact that it lacks the necessary subjective tonality. This should not be regarded as a paradox. Countless illustrations could be given of intricate adaptation reactions, known components of a conscious attitude towards reality, each of which is nevertheless realized in an absolutely "unconscious" way.

There is no doubt whatever that we can fully believe the facts Professor Musatti gives concerning inhibition of post-hypnotic suggestions inadmissible to the hypnotized person. We should not, however, consider them as something unexpected. Information about the influence of factors remaining unknown to the person whom they influence has accumulated in the course of decades, again independent of the development of psychoanalysis. Professor Musatti's reference to the desirability of comparing the data of psychoanalytical theory and experimental psychology merely confirms the specific features of the evolution

of our knowledge. Therefore in order to explain such influences, there is no need to go beyond the body of concepts which have been established historically, independent of psychoanalytic teachings and not even remotely influenced by them.

The concluding part of Professor Musatti's article touches upon two problems which are of special interest and importance but which may be too intricate for deep exploration within the limits of journal discussion. First of all there is the question of the mechanism of recovery, which ensues from a recognition of the suppressed drive. Professor Musatti notes the existence of a definite evolution of Freud's ideas about the mechanisms of recovery, as a result of which psychoanalytical theory changed from the old primitive teachings about catharsis to an understanding of how the therapeutic effect depends on the personality as a whole, on the relations established between the repressed impulses and the sum total of the affective and intellectual emotions of the patient. This evolution is seen especially clearly, according to Professor Musatti, in Freud's work *Recollecting, Repeating and Working Through*.

Musatti assumes that in the light of this evolution my statement to the effect that psychoanalysis interprets the entire problem of patterns of human behavior schematically and in an oversimplified if not a vulgarized way is totally incomprehensible. He assumes that I overlooked the evolution of the views he mentions, that only for this reason could I assert the derivation of the therapeutic effect of recognition from the fact that a conscious idea had been included in the new psychological situation, in the new attitude to reality—one which had always remained alien to Freud.

I did indeed state this, although the ideas developed in the above work by Freud might at first glance give the impression of being an argument in favor of the correctness of Professor Musatti's argument. However I have already noted that this entire question, which makes us turn to the theory of psychological patterns of behavior, is far too intricate to permit deep discussion here. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Professor Musatti, as he himself states, is unacquainted with the works of D. N. Uznadze and his school, which examine this theory in depth. I presume that Professor Musatti will excuse me if I do not give a detailed reply to these critical comments. Were I to do this, my initial thesis would be that the

drive towards action is the functional "unit" in Freud's system of ideas; Freud did not formulate any theory of the patterns of behavior, of the psychological system in which the movement of impulses takes place; hence the abstractness, the mistakes, and in the final analysis the pseudoscientific nature of Freud's ideas regarding the laws that determine the dynamics of affects and their realization in behavior. I believe that as our discussion develops further it would perhaps be worth devoting special attention to this important and intricate problem.

Another equally interesting question touched upon by Professor Musatti at the end of his article is the problem of the methods of psychoanalysis and the closely related problem of symbolism as a means of expressing the unconscious, a problem which occupies a prominent place in psychoanalytical theory.

Professor Musatti asks two questions concerning methods which I admit surprise me. He would like to know whether I consider the use of the methods of investigation of associations justified; secondly, what methods other than the psychoanalytic one do I suggest for the study of the "unconscious forms of psychic activity."

Replying to the first question I should like to stress the following thesis, which seems to me to be one of principle. I believe it would be difficult, if not impossible, to name a single method among those developed in experimental psychology, about which it could be said that its use was unjustified under any and all conditions. It seems to me there is no need of further proving that more important than the method itself is the interpretation of the data it supplies and the goal it pursues. Investigators of different orientation can have vastly different approaches. I therefore assume that not only can the use of the associative method in its various forms be justified but also investigation by the Rorschach method and others which are classed in the West as "clinical" psychological, including even, *horribile dictu!*, such "psychoanalytic" methods as the analysis of dreams.

As regards the question of investigative methods that can be recommended for study of "unconscious emotions," or to be more exact, for an analysis of the automatic activity of consciousness, Professor Musatti himself enumerated a number of them, in addition to those employed by psychoanalysts, while discussing experimental psychological techniques which could

serve as objective controls of psychoanalytical data. These methods are meant to uncover "profound and latent" psychological phenomena and, as Professor Musatti himself points out, effectively replace in the opinion of a number of psychologists and psychiatrists the long, laborious work of analysts.

On the basis of diverse modifications of many methods, and also on the basis of an analysis of so-called "attitudes" according to D. N. Uznadze's methods, it has become possible in recent years to assemble much interesting data on the specific features and dynamics of unconscious adaptation reactions. It therefore seems to me that Professor Musatti's reference to the danger confronting me of my becoming a metaphysician (in view of the fact that I seemingly agree with the existence of such reactions but do not possess the methods for investigating them) should not make me feel too panicky.

And now for the final theoretical problem—that of symbolism as a means of expressing the "unconscious." I should first of all like to point out that Professor Musatti himself approaches this problem very cautiously and with the wish to be objective, an attitude which inspires deep respect for him as a researcher on the part of those who do not share his theoretical convictions. Apparently feeling how unstable are the theses of the psychoanalysts in this sphere, Professor Musatti expresses the opinion that the interpretation of symbols is merely an auxiliary method in psychoanalytic investigation, one which must be used cautiously and with reserve. He goes on to say frankly that in the beginning of his work as a psychoanalyst he felt the same distrust towards interpretation of symbols which he feels opponents of psychoanalysis have. More than that, he states that this feeling has remained with him up to the present day. Nevertheless he assumes that the "unconscious emotions" have a tendency to manifest themselves in the sphere of the conscious in the form of symbols. In order to uncover their real significance, he developed a special method which he calls "convergent analysis." He assumes that the laws of symbolization were explained in the investigations of Shrötter and Silberer and that my attitude towards the entire problem reflects my lack of any clear idea of the function of the symbolic expression of unconscious emotions. In conclusion Professor Musatti develops the idea that "for the unconscious psychic activity" the symbol of the experience fully replaces the experience itself and is identified

with it. In his opinion this identification reflects regression from a mature mind to an infantile mind.

I shall confine myself merely to a few comments in this connection.

The doubts which Professor Musatti retains as regards the entire problem of symbolism seem to me very graphically to stress what has been unanimously confirmed over the course of decades by all opponents of psychoanalysis, namely, the absence of an objective, scientific approach in the psychoanalytic presentation of this problem. The ideas with which he finishes his analysis of symbolism—his remark about the identification of the symbol with the content symbolized—are most interesting, but as far as I can see, interesting from an entirely different point of view from that of their author: we encounter pathological forms of this type of identification in clinics for schizophrenics and persons with an expressed tendency towards such identification, at definite stages of the ontogenetic maturing of the mind. A further analysis of these processes can undoubtedly add a great deal to the understanding of the specific features of both disintegration and maturing of thought. Professor Musatti's statement that the symbol is fused with the thing being symbolized for "unconscious psychic activity" reflects only that characteristic personification of the unconscious, that consideration of the "unconscious" as a sort of independent phenomenon, which has always caused opponents of psychoanalysis to accuse Freud of creating myths, of endeavoring to introduce improvised categories that explain everything, but which do not stem from direct experiment. This method which at one time evoked Molière's immortal smile is close to the methods widely used in ancient philosophy. It has been condemned by European scientists, at least since the time of Galileo.

I have attempted to reply to all the critical comments directed against me by Professor Musatti. In summarizing I would say the following: It seems to me I will be expressing the opinion of many Soviet investigators if I point out that here we definitely reject the psychoanalytic concept. Freudian sociology and philosophy, which are inseparably connected with his psychology, are reactionary and idealist. Freudian psychology in the final analysis lacks objective scientific foundation. That makes Freud's teachings unacceptable to us. At the same time we must not overlook the concrete clinical and psychological

phenomena which psychoanalytic theory is attempting to analyze and solve, advancing towards their solution on the basis of methods which differ from those of Freud. With this understanding, we have grounds for productive discussion with supporters of psychoanalytic interpretations and naturally with Professor Musatti and his colleagues first of all. There is no doubt whatever that such an exchange of opinion, especially if conducted on the basis of concrete questions that can be experimentally verified, could in many ways contribute to the achievement of our common goal—that of discovering the laws to which the spiritual activity of man is subordinated.

I wish to express my sincere thanks to Professor Musatti for the attention he has devoted to his analysis of my work and for the many critical comments he had made, which I find most useful. I should be very happy if our discussion, which was begun so promptly on the initiative of our Italian colleagues, did not end with these lines but was continued further and more profoundly.

Film Trends: East and West

By Sergei Gerasimov

A leading Soviet film director (*The Young Guard*) recounts his discussions with Hollywood film executives and directors, indicates some aspects of the organization of the Soviet film industry, and presents his views of recent French, Italian and American films. ("Films and Man in the 1960's," *Izvestia*, August 12-14, 1960.)

Every evening the lights of motion picture signs flash on in all the cities of the West. Thousands of motion picture theaters invite the crowds to shake off the worries of everyday life and divert themselves with more or less fictitious screen stories. The beckoning lights of the neon signs take the shape of lovers clasped in embrace, murderers aiming their gun, dauntless men hanging perilously over abysses, kings and generals, apocryphal heroes, and finally plain ordinary people with plain worried faces.

Life's cauldron boils and bubbles and the film—that child of the century—hastens to reflect all the motley experiences, interests and temperatures of human passions.

But the nature of motion picture craft keeps changing with every year with each new film and its purpose changes apace. Prominence is given to the desire to fathom all the complicated and contradictory processes offered man by social life.

Hollywood—that motion picture Mecca of the thirties—is no longer prosperous. Its studios no longer produce from 600 to 700 pictures a year. It is finding it harder to draw people in with cowboy and adventure thrillers. It is forced to sit up and take notice now that it is faced with a dangerous rival in the shape of that younger spoiled child of the century—television.

The number of advertisements cluttering United States TV programs staggers the imagination of those who view them for

the first time. If in talking with American friends you ask the reason for this overwhelming onslaught you are told frankly that TV was created for this purpose, that old films* and new special TV plays are nothing but sugarcoated pills to make the necessary dosage of commercials easier to swallow.

But TV has one overwhelming advantage over motion pictures: with a flick of the hand the spectator can, without leaving his armchair, create a semblance of recreation for himself by selecting his programs or changing from one to another in the hope of finding something really interesting. Besides, having tired of this occupation he can simply switch the thing off. But to see a film he must go out and buy a ticket, sit in a hall with other people and risk the chance of hitting on the wrong film, seeing some awful rubbish and ruining his whole evening.

All this has gradually led to a complicated and unprofitable situation for the film producer of the West. But it would be wrong to assume that this situation is therefore also unprofitable for the spectator. He emerges the winner in the fierce commercial competition between TV and films.

In this connection we heard some rather contradictory comments voiced by Hollywood producers. They along with the owners of the companies complained of hard times, whereas the directors squared their shoulders and said that the era of commercial film-making was ended and the era of directors' films had begun.

Last June we had the opportunity to meet several outstanding American film directors in Hollywood. Some, like King Vidor who directed *War and Peace*, and Frank Capra, one of the older men, represented Hollywood's veterans. But we also saw Stanley Kramer of *On The Beach* fame, Richard Brooks who in recent years made several fine pictures about the working people of America including *The Catered Affair* which will soon be released on our screens, and Delbert Mann, the director of *Marty*, whom we had met earlier.

Sponsored by Arthur Breen, President of United Artists, and his partner Mr. Benjamin, who had invited our small group of film workers to the United States, the gathering was held at a time when American newspapers were filled with attacks against the Soviet Union; and our sponsors were afraid that the

* In accordance with an agreement concluded between motion pictures and TV, only films six years old or older may be shown on TV screens.

affair would end up by being purely official, with America represented by departmental people alone. But things turned out just the other way round. Ten minutes after the designated hour the hall was packed and we were surrounded by our American colleagues whose names we knew from films we had seen. From the very outset the atmosphere was one of friendly interest. Director G. Korzintsev, Docent V. Komarov of the State Film Institute and I were bombarded with the most diversified questions. And credit goes to the Americans for not wasting a second's time on the usual inane and provocative questions which are not questions so much as biased opinions voiced in the hope of hearing them confirmed. No, this time the talk was instantly directed toward problems of creative work, new artistic trends, the quest for new media and new ways of depicting life.

The reception soon lost its official character, the cocktails were set aside and everybody in the hall settled down around the Soviet group. When Frank Capra, in his capacity as officer of the Directors Guild of Hollywood, emerged as the chairman of this improvised meeting, the talk assumed an organized character.

What interested our American friends most of all?

They wanted to know how pictures were born in our film industry, who initiated them?

The writer and the film director, we replied. Next comes the studio and finally the state which finances the production of films. This did not make sense to them. We were asked to explain. Didn't we have any producers? The whole of their amazement was expressed in this question. We explained that we had no such designation in our film industry. Our films were made by creative collectives invested with the trust of the studio and the State Film Board.

Where did our new directors come from?

As a rule from the Film Institute, sometimes from the theater or the field of literature. We mentioned several recent pictures and their thirty-year-old directors.

The talk now turned to our opinions of American pictures. We said that we felt that contemporary search for form was negligible. However, American directors deserved credit for holding faithfully to realistic forms.

We recalled Kramer's first picture, *The Defiant Ones*, which we saw in the United States two years ago. This story of two

men—white and colored—united by bitter circumstances frankly and directly posed and resolved in its own way some burning issues of contemporary life. But Stanley Kramer went even further. He made *On the Beach*. Our press commented on this picture in connection with its première last December in seventeen capitals of the world.

We may disagree with its author as to how he chose to pose the problem. We may deplore the fact that the film is not sharp and direct enough in its social position and spiritual force. But the problem is one that today stirs the minds of all people, a problem of the greatest urgency and importance. Kramer told us that he was now busy preparing a film about the Nuremberg Trials. In it he intends to examine the nature of Nazism which today is again raising its head. It will probably be a very difficult undertaking. But for the idea alone I should like to commend the artist for whom art is primarily a means of expressing those most cherished thoughts that keep man's heart and soul alert.

There were others at the gathering with whom we found it interesting to talk and argue. The talk kept reverting to collective productions. Everybody agreed that such productions demand determination, a keen sense of novelty; that it would hardly be worthwhile to try classical works, to screen familiar literary *chefs-d'oeuvre* over and over again; that films must deal with new, original ideas, new observations and newly-born images; that businesslike cooperation should begin with the creative cooperation of the artists themselves.

* * *

At the festival in Cannes the first prize went to Fellini's *The Sweet Life*. Its closest rival was *The Ballad of a Soldier*. Highly praised too was our *Lady with the Dog*.

The heated arguments over the awards still continue. At the festival in Karlovy Vary I heard representatives of Western films furiously attack Fellini. Surprise was expressed at the fact that the jury had found it possible to award him the *Grand Prix* when, according to general opinion, first prize should have gone to *The Ballad of a Soldier*. It is hardly worth discussing at this time the decision of the jury, made after extensive arguments but with the necessary majority of votes. The point is that the two films did not draw attention at the Cannes festival for nothing. They have come to represent two distinct trends in world motion picture art.

The Ballad of a Soldier by V. Yezhov and G. Chukhrai was not understood at once. Perhaps its name was at fault. Viewers are tired of war pictures and naturally prefer films of peaceful life. However people of all ages and interests gradually came to see the film's timeless artistic meaning. Though it takes us back to the years of the Second World War, it is deeply contemporary in character. Its contemporaneity lies in the very essence of the two main characters, broadly and freely treated by the authors. The heroes of the film are very young. They were brought up and educated at a difficult time when young men and girls experienced the weight of responsibility much earlier than in a time of peace. The need to find their place in life, the ability to retain their dignity and fight for their cause to the end are the qualities that make for the heroes' appeal.

There are many touching and amusing scenes in the film. The viewer laughs a great deal, but without relinquishing his handkerchief. This is art that stirs one and arouses many associations. Having profoundly and honestly considered the phenomena of life, the authors choose the line of sympathy and follow it up to the end. Thus the content of life is revealed: the spiritual beauty, the selflessness and strong social consciousness of communist man, his indefatigable labors and hopes. These images cannot but reach even people of an opposed world outlook.

Most of the films presented at the Cannes festival by Western countries did not rise above a look at sexual problems, tending at times towards frank pornography. Only one film, justly singled out by the critics and judges, in its bitter exposure of the moral decay of the top strata of Western society rose to the level of important social generalization. This was Fellini's *The Sweet Life*. The title itself, charged as it is with acid irony, becomes the key to understanding the author's message.

Fellini is not a sweet-natured artist. His guiding principle is treatment of society's ills with bitter medicine. And in this most recent work he ruthlessly exposes the old world. With the merciless objectivity of a chronicler, scene by scene he shows a society where everything is for sale, from the church to the love embrace. He shows the loathsome aspects of the "sweet life" against which the full impact of his film is directed. It is another matter that, carried away by his passion and temperament, like Erskine Caldwell, he concentrates only on one side, or rather one section of the many-faceted Western society, a

society which nevertheless in all seriousness is called a "free world" by its masters.

The world of bestial passion is presented with savage force in this picture. It is enough to recall the final scene where, after an abominable orgy members of high society, like so many dead-faced monsters eaten by vice, set off in the morning for the oceanfront. Dragging themselves through the splendid pines towering along the coast, they chatter about man's atavistic yearning for nature, punctuating their talk with filthy grimaces. On the beach they meet some fishermen pulling in a monster fish. The monster is dead, but its round eye stares up ominously as if puzzled by the inhuman faces bent over it. The audience cannot help wondering which is the more monstrous—the rotting fish or the human flotsam which has reached a moral impasse and is doomed to self-destruction. This is a terrifying and cruel thought, and the author, sparing neither his own nor the actors' labor, has created a kind of new inferno, in which the ne'er-do-wells of society are doomed to rot.

This picture poses a great number of problems but certainly does not solve them. Fellini has never striven in any of his films to seek resolutions. But he can and does pose them with trenchant and angry directness. And each time he does this with ever greater artistic impact.

What is missing in this amazing, ruthless and very talented picture? Is it perhaps man himself who is missing?

Fellini's recurring theme is a struggle of man against the beast within him, but he never seems to find enough time, attention or spiritual strength to discern, understand and unreservedly love man. His pictures always deal with a hero who poses his bitter weakness against the evils of fate. In *La Strada* it is the little half-witted girl who wanders about with a traveling circus. In *Nights of Cabiria* it is Cabiria herself, a street-walker of the Roman suburbs, who is relentlessly cheated by fate. In both cases that astounding actress, Giulietta Masina, shares with the director the success of the film.

But Fellini's latest film does not have even this much of a hero. What we see is a flippant good-for-nothing who chooses the convenient profession of society reporter and gradually disintegrates in his milieu, turning into a beast himself since he is unable to resist the vortex that is sucking him in. But he does not rouse pity in us. We feel he does not deserve a better fate,

he is not the pivot upon which life revolves. Even the most shallow-minded among us understands that such a pivot was and always will be the man of labor.

The film's contradiction lies precisely in that it treats the nature of decay in an abstract way, concentrating the spectator's whole attention on the inner world of the rich who rule the world in accordance with the laws of social inequality. The absence of reality, which cannot be replaced by a few secondary episodes, tends to weaken the author's artistic aim. And yet the film attracts the spectator by dint of the passionate fury of its exposures and makes him realize this is no way to live, that we cannot reconcile ourselves to such a monstrous state of affairs. It arouses logical protest charged with the element of assertive power.

The contrast between the two films—the Italian and the Soviet—at the Cannes festival was perhaps the most significant highlight of our cinematographic time. It became not only a contrast between two worlds but a clash between two views of life, of man and his purpose. And paradoxical as the two films seem at first glance, they managed to complement each other. This is no way to live!—declared *The Sweet Life*. This is the way to live!—claimed *The Ballad of a Soldier*.

* * *

A traditional discussion by film workers was held at the 12th Film Festival in Karlovy Vary. This was the so-called Free Tribune. This year the Free Tribune attracted what seemed the greatest number of participants since its inception. The topics discussed were the best and worst pictures of the year and the trends that have taken shape in the biggest film studios of the world.

The French spoke of their "new wave." Critic Marcel Martin talked about it as though he were thinking aloud, and we could gather from his speech that he sympathized more with the name of this trend than its content. Then the discussion, whose theme was "Man in 1960," centered around the concept of "novelty."

The French film workers have always been pioneers in the search for new artistic forms. We recall the first films of the French *avant-garde*, the early works of René Clair, Jean Renoir and Jacques Feyder. At present there are new names and new trends. Martin was forced to speak with disapproval of many

films of the "new wave." Here too the sexual motif, the bed problem, as the French themselves say, has come to the fore. In Paris we saw several films where sex encounters were dealt with on a popular-scientific level, giving the public an all too frank exposé of love, if we can call it that. This exposé of the anatomy of passions that hardly touch the heart and soul willingly concentrates on pure physiology alone.

As a rule the "new wave" deals with relationships among the younger generation. Young people in black tights wander across the screen, shedding their garments from time to time with or without reason. They fool each other, betray each other, commit smaller or bigger crimes. The films end with murder, suicides or automobile crashes. Here too there is an element of reproach. But even the naked eye can see that this is not the film's message.

In order to understand the orientation of the "new wave," one should recall *Hiroshima Mon Amour*, a film by one of its talented leaders, Alain Resnais.

This film aroused widespread and heated discussion. The picture has many champions and as many, if not more, opponents. Perhaps this shows the degree of its significance. But interpretations differ. Obviously the sensational success of *Hiroshima Mon Amour* lies not so much in the interesting observations of the director as in the plot itself. It seems to protest against the atomic war. Hence its title. But this very protest demands our careful attention and study.

The heroine is a Frenchwoman. From her story we know that during the Hitler occupation she had fallen madly in love with a German, was locked in a cellar and there, according to her own admission, moaned and screamed her unappeased passion. She recalls this episode as she lies in the arms of her lover, a Japanese who witnessed the tragedy of Hiroshima. It is obviously the author's intention to show that everything in this world is transient and frankly paltry; all human relations except the embraces born of passion are the result of grim prejudice, idle inventions of people who wish to destroy one another.

Last November the editors of one of our magazines received an angry letter from a French schoolmistress in which she vigorously attacked the film. It is impossible, she wrote, either to agree with the author or even to understand his position. Can the blood shed by members of the Resistance, can the lives of

countless French patriots be laid at the feet of a harlot who shed every vestige of conscience and honor? If we follow in her footsteps we will find ourselves living a life of bestiality that can never be justified. Such was the gist of the letter. We can only agree with her. Yet this film enjoys amazing popularity among young Western audiences.

To them it justifies, as it were, the moods and views prevailing among Western youth, views which they themselves are inclined to call the ethics of the "lost generation."

All this makes us wonder and ask: What of this generation that loafs on the main streets of capitals or harangues in filthy pubs and night clubs? Has it lost its faith in humanity, in its future, in life and in work? Or has it simply long shed its conscience and elementary decency and, like the drunkard who blames his misfortunes on drink, is unable to discern between cause and effect and fails to understand that life is miserable because they have squandered it without reserve?

But this young riff-raff does not thrive in a vacuum. It is rooted in soil that has been generously fertilized with every kind of rot, where the way of life itself has engendered skepticism, disbelief in reason, injustice and vital creative aims. The art of feasting on the labors of others—that is the philosophy of this dying tribe.

The Western world is alarmed and worried. The fathers and mothers of the petty snobs who clown at home and in the street are searching for external reasons to explain away and ward off impending catastrophe. But apparently the roots are much deeper than those frightened by juvenile delinquency and debauchery imagine. Some of this is made clearer when we consider a film produced by a group of independents and playing under the title, *The Savage Eye*. This film deals not with the young, but with the fully mature generation of their fathers and mothers. Fashioned like a documentary, it rivals *The Sweet Life* in its bitter comment about our contemporaries. Oppressed by relentless advertising and meaningless debauchery, people in search of happiness wander about like blind pups, now colliding with one another, now falling down helpless.

Then the film-goers of the West go to see the Soviet *Ballad of a Soldier* and are amazed by this radiant picture. "How utterly pure it is," they murmur, "how unlike the truth!" as though trying to brush away the thought that the picture is a reflection

of the real state of affairs in a country they are as yet incapable of understanding.

Thus the film, that genuine child of the century, has become an integrating factor in the struggle between two ideologies, two worlds.

It is the future of humankind that is at stake. More important even than the sciences directed towards the furthering of progress, I believe, is the ability to educate man, to bring up our sons and daughters to be champions of life, of work, of human dignity and peace on earth. Film art, called upon to be a teacher of life, to educate the generations, can do a great deal in this respect. Yet we must admit that compared to its potential it still does very little.

On a world scale the film industry produces more than 2,000 feature films a year. More than 2,000 plots and scores of thousands of characters are annually flashed on motion picture screens. Hundreds of millions of spectators daily devote their attention to new films, hoping to find new impressions, new concepts of life, new experiences. More often than not they leave the theater disillusioned. The cunningly woven plots with their eternally shifting details do not change the sum total. There are no new discoveries. Everything seems limited to an expenditure of time, to superficial illusions that turn to ashes the moment the screen is once again dark. Even the script-writers and directors despair. After viewing one of the current commercial concoctions of their own making they feel ashamed of their profession.

I recently attended a showing of Eisenstein's film *Potemkin* at the International Students' Course in Gurzuf in the Crimea. The film marked the opening of a new film club and 150 young men and women, young minds of diverse background, were once again captivated by the genius of that remarkable picture.

Since it was made, film-making has traveled far in technique. Following the laws of continuous development, it strives for the most expressive, large, overpowering forms. Each year the young, the aging and the old innovators search the sound stages and editing rooms for new cutting combinations. Of course this is understandable. More often than not, we should thank them for otherwise we would not have achieved so high a film culture.

But when we study the films of the young Frenchman Chabrol who came to the cinema straight from the written word,

the Swedish Ingmar Bergman with his painful penchant for inexplicable complexities of human behavior, when we delight in the skillful mastery of the Japanese Kurasawa, our thoughts go back to the quest for innovation of our compatriots who paved the way for the art of film-making with their human philosophy, radiant ethics. Their innovations, rooted in depth of content and nourished by living revolutionary fervor, have grown into clear consummate forms. This was how Eisenstein and Pudovkin created their films, this is how Dovzhenko worked to the end of his days. They saw living humanity in all its gigantic height and breadth, the humanity for which they fought with the pure arms of their talent. And they bequeathed to us their sense of the new as a will to indefatigable battle for a better life. They charged us to understand man, singling out every trait of beauty in him, a pledge of future victories over nature, over all the remnants of bestial ethics that are dragging man back.

Our films are winning ever more meaningful victories at international festivals and are bringing Soviet cinematography well deserved fame. The point here is not the personal fame of the artist. In becoming teachers of life, film-makers lose the right to concoct cheap, make-believe, false plots. We have too many pupils all around the world who are anxious to hear us speak words of truth. We have a responsibility toward them.

Introduction to "The Diary of Anne Frank"

By Ilya Ehrenburg

This is Ehrenburg's foreword to the Russian translation of the widely known record of a young Jewish girl growing up in Nazi-occupied Holland. It was recently issued (August 1960) by the Foreign Literature Publishing House in Moscow.

The fate of this book is extraordinary. It appeared in Holland ten years ago, was translated into seventeen languages and bought up in millions of copies. Plays and motion pictures were made from it; essays were written about it.

This is not a novel by a celebrated author. It is the diary of a 13-year-old girl; but it shakes the reader more than a masterfully written book could do.

It is common knowledge that the Nazis killed six million Jews, the citizens of 20 countries, rich and poor, famous and unknown. For several years the Hitlerites hunted and trapped millions of people just as wolves are hunted and trapped. The Jews tried to hide, burying themselves in holes, in deserted mines, in the crevices of the cities; for days, months and years they awaited reprisals. Six million were asphyxiated in gas chambers, shot in gullies or in forts, doomed to a slow death by hunger. They were cut off from the world by the walls of ghettos, the barbed wire of concentration camps. Nobody knows what they thought or felt. A single voice—not of a sage or a poet, but of an ordinary little girl—speaks for those six million.

Anne Frank kept a diary like many girls of her age; she was given a thick copybook on her birthday and began to enter into it the events of her youthful life. Her youthful life, however,

thanks to the grownups, soon lost its bloom. The girl's diary turned into both a human document of paramount significance and a bill of indictment.

What did Anne see? A crowded attic where honest and brave Dutchmen had for 25 months hidden eight doomed persons: a German emigrant, Otto Frank; his wife; his two daughters, Margot and Anne; the Van Daan couple; their son Peter and the dentist Dussel.

In Sartre's play, *No Exit*, hell turns out to be an ordinary room in which three sinners are confined forever. The eight persons lived in a shelter, argued and quarreled; they were neither saints nor heroes; they were simply ordinary people. And Anne recounted their life day after day.

Otto Frank was born in Germany, studied at a high school and then in a university. During the First World War he was at the front. He was promoted to lieutenant, took part in one of the most bloody battles near the French town of Cambrai. He said he had regarded himself as a German. He also said that in his youth in Frankfurt, where he had lived, he had never come across any display of anti-Semitism. He thought that his life was firmly settled. Then Hitler came to power and everything collapsed like a house of cards. Otto Frank managed to get to Holland and bring his family there. The girls studied in a Dutch school, made friends with the Dutch children. Otto Frank realized that he had to begin life anew. He built a new life, then everything crashed again: the German army occupied Holland.

Why had the fascists vented their fury primarily on the Jews? Thick books were written about this offering elaborate explanations, but they explained nothing at all. Numerous age-old prejudices, legends that were more like bad anecdotes, superstitions built up into a philosophical system, envy, blockheadedness, the necessity for finding a scapegoat—all this wove itself into a single net which cut Anne off from her little Dutch girl friends and six million people from their neighbors and countrymen.

There is nothing in Anne's diary that could not have been written by a Dutch, French or Italian girl. The Hitlerites pinned a six-pointed star to her dress and she took this with profound incomprehension, but also with profound dignity.

Reading some of the pages of the diary you smile, but it is a fleeting smile: the end of the book is all too clear. The 13-

year-old girl writes that she will give the book she likes to her children; she tells herself how wondrous life is in novels—she, for instance, would never dare to remain alone with a strange man. . . . This was written by a child who grew up in the underground, immured. When she reached the age of 15, she wanted to love somebody. Since there was the boy Peter in the "shelter," she told herself she loved him.

In prison and concentration camp men withstood the most horrible trials when they had an aim in mind, when they were carried away by even illusory activities. What could a little girl of 13 do? Study? Anne tried to study. Play? She tried to. She pretended to be a writer. She kept her diary, composed stories and began to write a novel. This sustained and saved her: of all the games she chose the hardest, but also perhaps the most human.

After reading the diary to the end the reader will naturally ask, "What happened to Anne?" Ernst Schnabel checked archive documents and found witnesses and in his book, *Anne Frank, A Portrait in Courage*, told of her fate.

Anne's last entry was dated August 1, 1944. She tried to understand the contradictions tearing the human soul. And on the morning of August 4 the Gestapo men invaded the "shelter." The Jews and the two Dutchmen accused of hiding the Jews were put in prison. Several days later the Jews were sent to the deportation camp of Westerbork. On September 3 a huge party of Jews was sent from there to Oswiecim. On October 30 Anne and Margot were transferred to the Bergen-Belsen Concentration Camp. Margot died of malnutrition at the end of February, 1945. Anne died several days later.

Anne's mother perished in Oswiecim. Dussel was killed in a gas chamber. Peter was killed. The Van Daan couple both died. Gravely ill, the Dutchman Koophuis was soon let out. Kraler was sent to the Amersfoort Camp and in March 1945, while being driven to Germany, he managed to escape.

Of the eight Jews who had hidden in the attic, Otto Frank alone survived. On occupying Oswiecim the Soviet Army liberated the few who had not yet been killed. Otto Frank returned to Holland, skirting Europe via Odessa and Marseilles, but found none of his family alive. All he found was Anne's diary. . . .

The Gestapo men had been looking for valuables: they were

not interested in school copybooks. The diary was picked up by the Dutchwomen Elli and Miep.

I should like to add two human stories to the above terse data.

DeWiek, who was at the deportation camp of Westerbork, recounted the following:

"I saw Anne Frank and Peter Van Daan every day. They were always together. . . . Anne's eyes shone. . . . Her movements were so free and her gaze so direct and open that I told myself, 'She must really be happy here! . . .'"

Anne wrote in her diary about her school chum:

"Yesterday evening, as I was falling asleep, I suddenly saw Lies very clearly. She stood before me, ragged, emaciated, with sunken cheeks. Her big eyes were turned to me reproachfully, as though she wanted to say: 'Anne, why did you leave me? Help me, please! Take me out of this hell. . . .'" Anne wrote these lines in November 1943, uninformed of Lies' fate. But Lies survived. She said she had met Anne at the Bergen-Belsen Concentration Camp:

"She was in rags. Even in the darkness I could see how thin she'd become. Her cheeks were sunken, and her eyes had grown still larger. . . . We cried together, stood there and cried—separated by barbed wire. . . ."

A single voice out of six million has reached us. It is only a child's voice, but it contains worlds of strength—sincerity, humaneness, and talent as well. Not every writer could describe the inhabitants of the "shelter" and their own feelings as well as little Anne had.

On March 29, 1944 Anne wrote:

"Yesterday Minister Bolkestein said over the Oranne station* that after the war the diaries and novels of our contemporaries should be published. Of course, it would be interesting suddenly to have my novel, *The Secret Anneze*, printed. Its name would make everybody think it was a detective novel. But seriously, wouldn't it seem incredible after the war, say ten years hence, if we were to recount how we, a Jewish family, had lived here? . . ."

Since then not ten but 16 years have passed. Anne was mistaken: recently the signs of the swastika have reappeared on the walls of some European cities. In West Germany there are

* [Dutch radio station in London—Ed.]

people who say out loud, "Too bad Hitler didn't massacre the whole lot." They are irked by the fact that Anne's father was not killed. . . .

The law of "racial purity" during Hitler's time was drawn up by Hans Globke. Six million innocent victims are on his conscience. Six million perished—and Dr. Hans Globke, Chancellor Adenauer's right hand, distributes money for propaganda.

When the Hitlerites invaded Holland another "doctor," Dr. Hermann Konrig to be precise, was appointed government commissar of the Netherlands. Anne Frank and her parents followed his every move with horror. How was Dr. Hermann Konrig punished for the tears and blood shed by Anne Frank? He is now a deputy of the Bundestag, a member of the governmental Christian-Democratic faction. I repeat: not in an attic, not in a crevice, but in the parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany!

Anne was in the deportation camp of Westerbork. It was there that the echelons of the doomed were formed. The Westerbork Concentration Camp was ruled by SS Albert Konrad Hemekker, who resides at present in Dusseldorf. In that city the champions of peace were tried. But the heads of the concentration camps are not being tried in that city, and Albert Konrad Hemekker has in his old age engaged in commercial enterprise.

Oswiecim worked for the IG Chemical Trust and the IG Trust in its turn worked for Oswiecim, supplying it with "cyclon" asphyxiating gas. I was at the Nuremberg trial where they spoke a great deal about that. Contact between the command of the SS and the "industry" of Oswiecim was maintained by Himmler's closest adviser, Karl Wolf. Anne's mother and her first love, Peter, perished in Oswiecim. Karl Wolf is calmly spending the last years of his life in a charming villa on the shores of an idyllic lake. Max Faust, chief engineer of Oswiecim, is working in the IG Trust and enjoying life.

The moral is clear. It is possible in the middle of the 20th century to murder old people and children, poison people with gases, keep quiet at the right moment, bide one's time, in order 15 years later to watch with satisfaction young candidates for executioners, for assassins of the people marching in goosestep.

Anne Frank admitted she was little interested in politics. She did not play tribunal or parliament. She wanted to live. She

dreamed of love. She would have made a fine mother. She was killed.

Her diary reminds everyone of the crime that was perpetrated and warns that it must not be allowed to happen again!

Millions of readers know Anne Frank as though they had seen her themselves. Six million entirely innocent people were killed. One pure, childish voice lives on: it has proved stronger than death.

The Electronic Brain Helps the Surgeon

By S. Iarmoliuk

This article on the use of electronic computers in surgery appeared in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, August 5, 1960.

A notice in the newspaper *Vecherniaia Moskva* recently caught our eye. The A. V. Vishnevskii Surgery Institute of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences wanted engineers for operating electronic computers. But surgery and electronic computers seemed to us so incompatible that we approached Prof. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Vishnevskii, Director of the Institute, for an explanation. Here is what he told us:

"In the recent past engineering in medicine has added to the abilities of our hands and our senses. But soon engineering will help the physician to think. Such thinking machines will be especially vital in surgery.

"Imagine an operation in progress when not hours or minutes, but actual seconds count. The data on the state of the organism, such as the patient's pulse, his blood pressure, respiration and temperature, should be continuously available. For this purpose a modern operating room is equipped with various complex apparatus. Nevertheless the data thus obtained are often insufficient, immediate analysis of them is difficult and takes too much time. Yet some data, electrocardiographic control for example, can be of value only if reported immediately.

"This is where electronic computers must come to the rescue. Apart from receiving and processing all necessary data, within a split second they can also draw adequate conclusions. Before long these machines will appear in the Cybernetics Laboratory of our Institute."

Though the new laboratory has only recently been set up and there is still an empty look about it, several members of the staff have already been invited to work there. The young engineers V. Andreev and V. Epifanov together with Dr. D. Khodosh are looking forward to their future activities. The laboratory is headed by M. L. Bykhovskii, Dr. Sc. (Engineering), while general supervision is the joint responsibility of Academician I. I. Artobolevskii and Prof. A. A. Vishnevskii.

Electronic computers have already been installed in the laboratory and assigned the important task of processing systematizing data on patients' cards. The information thus received will be a basis for the operation of the electronic machines. The first machine of this kind is now being installed.

"What is the principle of its operation?" we asked M. D. Lerner, an engineer.

"The 'memory' of the machine records the symptoms of certain diseases, in particular cardiovascular complaints. The physician need only introduce additional data on the patient's age, blood pressure and temperature. The machine will decipher them and diagnose the case without error. But this is only a beginning. Later the possibilities of diagnostic electronic machines will expand even more. Gauges will be applied to the patient's heart or lungs to register the state of his organism. They will be able to predict the outcome of an operation or the progress of a disease.

"Before long the Cybernetics Laboratory will come to life. We need specialists not only in medicine but also in physics, statistics and higher mathematics. Technicians will supervise the operation of the machines, physicians study the clinical cases, and mathematicians generalize this experience and work out the programs."

Quite recently everything we have described above might have seemed sheer fantasy. Today this is a realistic prognosis for medicine in general and surgery in particular.

Modern Science in Crime Detection

By A. Vinberg

The author of this article, who is Director of the Scientific Research Institute of Criminal Law of the Procurator's Office of the USSR, makes available to the man in the street facts about modern scientific crime detection. ("Invisible Trails," *Izvestia*, September 13, 1960.)

I was on my way to a conference of criminologists in Leningrad. There were two other people in my compartment, a mathematician and a literary scholar. As often happens while traveling, we struck up a conversation. I was startled to realize that my companions knew less about crime detection than about the possibilities of life on Mars. Their ideas on the subject seemed to have been derived entirely from detective stories.

It is said that nature abhors a vacuum. In the absence of reliable popular works on criminal law and investigation methods a number of cheap, sensational books have appeared whose writers, lacking any real knowledge of the complex and difficult work carried on by investigation organs, have vied with one another to create a trite image of a modern Sherlock Holmes. This is usually a major or colonel of the militia who singlehandedly carries out the most intricate jobs of search, interrogation and investigation and of course almost immediately solves any crime.

This legend of the all-knowing personality, perpetuated from book to book, can do much harm. It disarms the reader and weakens his vigilance when it comes to real-life situations. Since the investigating bodies have personnel that can do everything and know everything, why be concerned about helping them? The fact is, however, that in our work we constantly do depend on the public.

As distinct from other scientists, the criminologist is pressed for time. The detective and the judge cannot afford to wait in-

definitely for his findings. The range of our work is also extremely broad. We cannot know beforehand what data we may need.

A machine specialist does not care what machine tool processes the parts of his machine. The ballistics expert does not necessarily need to know what traces remain on the bullet fired from a particular gun. But the criminologist must have exact answers to all questions. In many cases the life of a human being may depend on such knowledge.

Criminal law makes wide use of the latest achievements in the natural and technical sciences—physics, chemistry, biology, physiology, psychology and cybernetics. I would like to offer the reader several examples taken at random of how the sciences help solve crime and establish truth.

Let us first look into the past. If in other times it was necessary to determine at what distance a shot had been fired, a hunter was invited to determine this by sight. The teacher of calligraphy would offer "profound" conclusions regarding anonymous slanderers. Such "expert opinion" could hardly be of much help to the investigator.

In our day, no matter what the criminal's tricks, criminal law can place in the hands of the investigator important data that help him find some silent witnesses of what has taken place.

In a shop a worker suddenly collapses at his bench. No one heard a shot being fired or saw the person who did the shooting, but a man has died from a wound in the chest. At first it was assumed that this was simply an industrial injury, that during the processing of some part a piece of flying metal hit the worker. But physics came to the aid of the criminologist. The shirt of the dead man was examined by an electrographic method and a metal ring with particles of lead discovered around the hole. After that it was easy enough to establish that the criminal, who had a personal score to settle with the victim, shot him from beyond the bench when the shop was especially noisy.

A warehouse had been robbed. The thieves had driven up at night and broken the locks. Detectives arrived at the scene in the morning. First of all they studied all the tire marks. Then one of them photographed a high snow drift.

A surprised onlooker wanted to know why the shot of the snow. It turned out that the detective suddenly realized that the car, moving in reverse, had hit the snowdrift and the license plate number might have been impressed in it. With proper lighting

and photographing of the "invisible" number the detective obtained the necessary data. Soon the laboratory had the criminal's "visiting card." The clue led to his quick apprehension.

The above examples are fairly elementary. Complex methods of research such as luminescent, X-ray structural and spectral analysis, the use of radioactive isotopes and application of electronic optics have become routine for the criminologist.

The layman may wonder of what use ultrasonics may be in criminal investigation. Just imagine that the criminal has stolen a revolver and filed off the serial number. By making use of a special installation the criminologist can restore it in a matter of minutes. Ultrasonics will also rapidly "wash off" the India ink with which a document may be bespattered. Another instrument designed and made at our own Institute—an electronic-optic selector—makes "invisible" texts easy to read.

As for involving specialists in the most varied branches of knowledge in the work of an experts' commission, I can cite the following example. A warehouse manager staged a robbery in order to cover up his embezzlement. He claimed that thieves had taken the goods through a door which had not been sealed. When a spider's web was discovered on the door the embezzler, unperturbed, tried to say it had appeared after the robbery had taken place. The detective had availed himself of entomology, the science that treats of insects. Expert opinion categorically established that the web had been in existence for at least six months. The embezzler then admitted his guilt.

Court handwriting experts are now able to establish with precision the identity of forgers of documents. This helps track down blackmailers, swindlers, spies and forgers of state documents.

There was the case of a man who, for purposes of personal revenge, stole a secret document from a colleague. Several days later he dropped the document in a mailbox after attaching an anonymous note to the effect that he had found the paper in the street. The note had been written by a third person who tried to disguise his handwriting. Nevertheless it was established by experts that the note had been written by the man's wife.

To deal with the problem of the limitations of intentional changes in handwriting specialists made a serious study of the physiological laws established by Academician Ivan Pavlov, par-

ticularly the principle of the formation of temporary relationships in the cortex of the brain.

The science of criminal law is used successfully not only to solve crimes but also for purely peaceful purposes, such as establishing the authorship of ancient documents or investigating organic matter discovered during excavations on the Scythian mounds.

Recently criminologists have "discovered" a new photograph of the noted Russian physician N. Pirogov, established that certain controversial chess notations had in fact been made in his youth by Aleksandr Alekhine, restored the original score of a manuscript by Tchaikovsky and solved many other interesting riddles.

A group of mountain climbers in the Caucasus came upon the remains of Soviet soldiers who had stood guard at the Marukh Pass. Papers found on the bodies were so covered with blood they were indecipherable. However we easily read them with the aid of an infra-red transformer. It was a list of the men who had defended the pass.

Not long ago the workers at a plant were busy with plans for a new instrument. But one capricious part broke down time and again. For a long time they failed to pin down the trouble. Finally they decided to ask the help of criminologists "just in case." Painstaking investigation carried out in our laboratory pinpointed the trouble. The workers heartily thanked the staff of the Institute.

People in the most diverse branches of science, if their attention were drawn to the problems of criminal law, could play a big role in wiping out crime. Taking an active part in the creation of new instruments, they could help provide our detectives and experts with better technical equipment.

Popular Participation in Government

This report in *Izvestia*, September 5, 1960 (abridged) emphasizes the importance of enlisting the voluntary participation of Soviet citizens in administering the state apparatus and argues against restricting this participation within narrow limits.

Lenin's theory is now a reality. The citizens of the Soviet Union—men and women in every walk of life—are today participating in every way possible in deciding state matters.

In the past few years the most vital decisions on the reorganization of industrial and construction management, as well as of machine-tractor stations and schools, were made only after nationwide discussion. In this way participation in the guidance of the state by the masses of the people is not a matter of words, but of action. Similarly, the composition of Soviets, from village council all the way up to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, is a matter of the broadest democratic representation of the working people.

The Soviets of Working People's Deputies are in charge of a vast and complex economy. In their work the local Soviets come into contact in one way or another with practically all aspects of life in human society. They are in charge of public catering and trade, education and public health, housing and the municipal economy, conservation, law and order, social security for the working people, finance, local industry and agriculture.

But if we examine the staffs of the departments and offices of the Executive Committees, we shall see that they are not large. This is where the "wonderful means" cited by Lenin comes to the aid of these staffs. Without the broadest participation of alert, energetic volunteers, without the assistance of public bodies the Soviets would not be able to do one-tenth of what they are doing.

Bear in mind, for instance, that public bodies in Moscow have more than 400,000 members. How could the housing and

communal service departments cope with their tasks without the active help of the 27,000 members of house and block committees? How could the parents' committees, women's, pensioners' and hospital councils get along without volunteer help? And what of the thousands of volunteer militiamen who walk up and down the streets, the public inspectors who help keep an eye on trade and public catering? The number of such reliable unpaid assistants are legion.

In every undertaking which starts in a republic or region, in a city or rural community, in the street or courtyard, the population immediately joins in and swiftly sets up a committee or a commission. Public interest and participation mount in this work.

Recently in Smolensk Region, for instance, the most advanced collective farms set about improving their villages. Councils for assistance in construction work sprang up immediately. The first council was set up in the village of Prudki, Pochinki District. The Pochinki District Soviet saw in this eleven-man body a true and reliable assistant in the new undertaking.

This is how by action rather than words the Party carefully and attentively teaches everyone how to regard popular undertakings. Unfortunately there are some people who still fail to understand this. Some Executive Committee staff workers believe that if a house council has taken up the job of planting shrubbery in their yard, or a parents' committee has decided to check on how lunches are prepared for their children at school, or a women's council has appealed to the youth to build a volleyball court, then these matters, though useful, must be trifling and insignificant.

This view is wrong. The public bodies are doing difficult work on a volunteer basis without pay. They unselfishly invest their time in a common cause. This must never be underestimated. The initiative of the working people must be supported in every way. At the same time there exists an opinion that these public bodies have multiplied so greatly and are tackling so many things that they are beginning to duplicate one another and impede the organizations they are checking. The conclusion is obvious that it is necessary strictly to limit their sphere of activity: to keep the pensioners' councils out of trade affairs for instance, because there are trade union inspectors to do this work; similarly, women's councils ought to concentrate on

"women's affairs" and not interfere in improvement matters. In other words, the cobbler should stick to his last.

At first glance this attitude seems reasonable. Indeed it sometimes does happen that a shop is checked by several bodies in a row and the duplication quite naturally irritates the shop staff. The premise is correct; but the conclusion cannot be supported.

The Soviets are an all-embracing apparatus belonging to the people, they are intended fully to exercise their power over the territories they cover and to guide all branches of economy and culture. They are charged with wisely, carefully, thoughtfully directing the activities of all public bodies regardless of departmental affiliations. It would be all too easy to limit public bodies, to "put them in their place." To guide them and channel their activities is more complicated. But this is precisely what is required. Therefore it behooves the local Soviets day by day to pay close attention to the way work is being organized among their trusted, active assistants.

Popular effort and action are like a big river into which many small streams spill their lifegiving waters. There should be no obstacles in the way of these freshets. Even if at first glance this may appear trifling, it is vital at each step to have the assistance and support of every level of Soviets.

Index to **The Soviet Review, Vol. 1** **(August-December 1960)**

	<i>Number</i>	<i>Date</i>
City Planning		
V. A. Kucherenko: How Can Our Cities Be Improved?	2	September
N. V. Baranov: Regulating the Size of Cities, Buildings and Neighborhoods	2	September
S. V. Kurashov: City Planning and Public Health	2	September
Education		
N. Kurakin: Using Visual Aids to Instill Communist Ethics	2	September
M. Prokof'ev: A Soviet View of American Higher Education	2	September
Advice to Parents	4	November
K. Z. Asaturova: Parent-Teacher Cooperation	4	November
Government		
Georgi Shakhnazarov: When the State Has Withered Away	4	November
Popular Participation in Government	5	December
Literature and the Arts		
N. Tikhonov: A Plea for Poetry	1	August
A. Chegodaev: Reactions to an Exhibition of English Art	2	September
I. Vaisfeld: Critical Comments on Soviet Film Theory and Practice	2	September
M. Kuznetsov: Prognosis for the Novel, East and West	3	October
Irakli Andronikov: Solomon Mikhoels: Actor, Director, Critic	3	October
Dmitrii Shostakovich: Musical Modernism and Individuality	3	October
B. Meilakh: The Psychology of Literary Creation	4	November
B. Ioganson: A Painter's Notes	4	November
Sergei Gerasimov: Film Trends: East and West	5	December
Ilya Ehrenburg: Introduction to <i>The Diary</i> of Anne Frank	5	December

Psychology and Psychiatry

Activities of Soviet Psychologists	3	October
F. V. Bassin: A Critical Analysis of Freudianism	5	December
F. V. Bassin: Rejoinder	5	December
Cesare L. Musatti: An Answer to F. V. Bassin's Criticism	5	December

Science and Technology

I. E. Tamm: A Soviet View of Einstein	1	August
A. I. Berg: Cybernetics and Society	1	August
What's Wrong With Our Medical Services?	1	August
L. S. Fegel'man: Some Aspects of Future Plant Design	2	September
Life on the Second Spaceship	3	October
Norbert Wiener's Discussion With Soviet Philosophers	4	November
S. Iarmoliuk: The Electronic Brain Helps the Surgeon	5	December
A. Vinberg: Modern Science in Crime Detection	5	December

Social Analysis and Criticism

L. N. Kogan: The Nature of Work in the Future Communist Society	1	August
N. P. Kostin: Free Time Under Communism	1	August
A Soviet Sociology Seminar	1	August
Soviet and British Historians to Meet	1	August
Y. A. Zamoshkin: The "Lonely Crowd" Under Capitalism	3	October

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

C15

0	E2E	□
1	328	
2	E32	
3	235	
4	538	
5	E85	
6	388	7588

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1	328	
2	E32	
3	235	
4	538	
5	E85	
6	388	7588